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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  
Constitutions around the world are being revised. Indigenous Peoples are finally 
beginning to gain more recognition in these colonial rule books. Historically, Indigenous Peoples 
have rarely been mentioned at all in these founding documents, despite being the founding 
Peoples their countries. Today however, the very same documents that were once used to justify 
the discrimination of Indigenous Peoples, are striving to promote greater respect, rights, 
sovereignty and self-determination for First Peoples around the world.  
While Indigenous Peoples around the globe suffered from similar oppressions as a result 
of colonialism, the progress made to correct these wrongdoings is occurring at different rates. In 
Australia, it was not until 1962 that Aboriginals were given the right to vote under the Australian 
Constitution, and it was not until 1967 that they were included in censuses.1 Today, in Australia, 
there is a large push to remove certain constitutional provisions still capable of discriminating 
against Australian Aboriginals, and to include a preamble to the Australian Constitution that will 
recognize Aboriginals as the First Peoples of Australia.2 In the Scandinavian countries of 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland, recent constitutional amendments or parliamentary acts have 
allowed the Sami to establish their own parliaments. These parliaments seek to further Sami 
                                                
1. “History of the Indigenous Vote.” Australian Electoral Commission, Kingston, 2006: 18. 
http://www.aec.gov.au/indigenous/files/history_indigenous_vote.pdf   
2. “Constitutional Reform: Creating a Nation for All of Us,” Sydney: Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2011. 15, 18. https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/constitutional-reform-creating-
nation-all-us-2011  
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sovereignty and self-determination by allowing the Sami greater control over their own cultural 
and linguistic affairs and natural resources.3  
But for an Indigenous group in Canada, the Métis, the struggle to be included in the 
Canadian constitution in a way that will promote respect and self-determination is an ongoing 
battle. The Métis are seeking the recognition as an Indigenous nation and the rights of self-
determination and respect that come with such recognition. However, they are seeking to do so 
in a document that has long denied Metis’ status as an Aboriginal People and has perpetuated an 
incorrect understanding of the Metis.  
 
The Métis and the Daniels Case 
Usually referred to as “the offspring of the fur trade”, Métis history is inextricably linked 
to the Canadian fur trade.4 Distinct Métis communities first appeared on the plains of west-
central North America during the late eightieth and early nineteenth centuries.5 These Métis 
communities were the result of close relationships between Europeans and Indians, due to the 
expansive fur trade which dominated the Western Canadian plains at the time.6 Fur traders who 
came from Europe to work in the fur trade were prohibited by their employer from bringing their 
European wives with them to North America.7 This meant that fur traders formed close relations 
                                                
3. Corinne Lennox and Damien Short. Handbook of Indigenous Peoples' Rights, (Routeledge 
International, 2016).   
The Sami Parliament of Norway was inaugurated in 1989, the Sami parliament of Sweden was 
inaugurated in 1993, and finally, the Sami parliament of Finland opened in 1996. For a discussion on the 
Sami Parliaments, and their varying degrees of autonomy over Sami affairs. 
4. Patrick C. Douaud, The Western Métis: Profile of a People. Regina: U of Regina, Canadian Plains 
Research Center, 2007, 6. 
5. John Weinstein, Quiet Revolution West: The rebirth of Métis Nationalism, (Calgary: Fifth House 
Publishers, 2007), 2. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Theodore Binnema, Gerhard J. Ens, and R. C. Macleod, From Rupert's Land to Canada, 
(Edmonton: U of Alberta, 2001), 81.  
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with Indigenous women, which their employers did not protest, as such relations established 
links of communications between fur traders and Indigenous communities.8 These men 
eventually fathered children with Indigenous women, who were usually Cree, Ojibwa or 
Saulteaux women.9 
Most children of the fur-trade neither exclusively identified with their Indian or European 
relatives. Instead, a unique phenomenon occurred where most fur-trade children forged a unique 
Indigenous identity; that of the Métis. They created their own communities and and eventually, 
their own political organizations.10 The Métis became a distinct Indigenous nation that bridged 
together certain aspects of Indian culture, language, practices, as well as certain aspects of 
European life.11 They consciously adopted certain aspects from their Indian heritage they thought 
would be valuable, while also choosing to maintain certain aspects from their Indian heritage. 
The Métis adopted certain European technologies to their Indigenous knowledge of the land and 
wilderness, which allowed the Metis to become skilled buffalo hunters.12 The Metis also became 
pivotal players in the fur trade, through serving as “middlemen”, capable of navigating the two 
distinct social systems involved in the fur trade; that of Indian communities and fur-trading 
posts.13  
At this time, the Métis were referred to as half breeds by their colonial governments. This 
name was given to the Metis who originally were the children of one Indian parent, and a 
European parent. Accordingly, the Métis were viewed as literally half Indian and half white.14 
                                                
8. Binnema, 91. 
9. Patrick C. Douaud, “Canadian Metis Identity: A Pattern of Evolution,” Anthropos, 78.1/2 (1983): 
73. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40461005.pdf?_=1459385201244   
10. Weinstein, 3. 
11. Teillet, Jean. Métis Law in Canada. Vancouver: Pape Salter Teillet, 1999, 1-2.  
12. Weinstein, 2. 
13. Binnema, 162. 
14. Douaud, 71. 
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The name the Métis now call themselves however, more accurately reflects Métis identity from a 
Métis perspective. The word “Métis” originated from the French word “Métissage,” which can 
be described as “the process of social mixture, both spontaneous as well as guided”.15 This word 
more accurately describes the Métis, as it explains the process of mixing or blending that the 
Métis deliberately engaged in, in order to create their own communities, their own lifestyle, and 
their own Indigenous identities.  
However, settlers and colonizers understood Indigenous identities mainly as racial 
identities, and as such, thinking of the Métis as half breeds was the only way colonial 
governments made sense of the Métis.16 Under a racial understanding of Indigenous identities, 
the Métis were thought of as having one part of them that matched the racial identity of Indian, 
and another part of them that was understood as white, or European.17 Since the Métis were 
considered to be half Indian, half white, they were treated accordingly, as either Indian in some 
instances, and white in other instances. As the following chapters will show, this inconsistent 
treatment by the British government and later, by the Canadian federal government, has persisted 
to this day.  
The clearest example of the Métis being treated as half breeds, or as half Indian and half 
white, is seen throughout the Métis’ inclusion within the Canadian Constitution, the Constitution 
Act, 1867. When Canada entered confederation and drafted its founding document, Section 
91(24) of the Constitution gave the federal government the exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, 
                                                
15. Devrim Karahasan, “Métissage in New France: Frenchification, Mixed Marriages and Métis as 
Shaped by Social and Political Agents and Institutions 1508-1886,” PhD diss., European University 
Institute. (2006). 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/7765/2008_Karahasan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
16. Chris Anderson,“Métis”: Race, Recognition, and the Struggle for Indigenous Peoplehood, 
(Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2014), 36. 
17. Ibid., 37.  
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and Lands reserved for the Indians”. This constitutional provision therefore gave the federal 
government the ability to enact laws and create programs for Indians.18 However, with no clear 
definition of who constitutes an “Indian”, under this constitutional power, the Métis have been 
treated as Indian in some instances and white in others.   
After decades of enduring inconsistent treatment as Indian under the Constitution, a 
prominent Métis leader, Harry Daniels, filled an action with the federal court system, demanding 
that the Supreme Court clarify whether the Metis are Indians under Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution. The case has made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, who now has the 
opportunity to reject a racialized understanding of Metis identity and to finally view the Métis as 
an Indigenous group of Canada. 
 
Research Question 
The Supreme Court of Canada is currently deciding the Harry Daniels v. Canada case, 
which seeks to answer whether the Métis are included as Indians under Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution, and therefore, also answer whether the Métis fall under the jurisdiction of the 
federal government.19 The Supreme Court must also decide whether the federal government has 
a fiduciary duty towards the Métis, meaning it must act in the best interest of the Métis, and 
whether the federal government has a duty to consult the Métis.20  
This paper will also answer whether the Métis should be found to be Section 91(24) 
Indians and whether fiduciary duty and a duty to consult exists between the federal government 
                                                
18. The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, 12, Last modified April 18, 2016, 
http://canlii.ca/t/ldsw  
19. Daniels v. Canada., [2013] FC 6. The Canadian Legal Information Institute, January 8, 2013, 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2013/2013fc6/2013fc6.html  
20. Ibid., 3b, 3c.  
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and the Métis. This paper will demonstrate why the Supreme Court should rule that the Métis are 
Section 91(24) Indians, as well as demonstrate why fiduciary duty and the duty to consult exists 
between the federal government and the Métis. More specifically, this paper will find that, while 
the lower courts involved in the Daniels case came to the right conclusion by finding that the 
Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, their method was seriously flawed. The lower courts 
inappropriately relied on viewing Section 91(24) as a racial classification and therefore, they 
relied on an understanding of the Métis as a mixed people. This paper will show how the 
Supreme Court can still find that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, but through a different 
and more appropriate method. The method proposed in this paper will reject the idea of the Metis 
as mixed, while also incorporating lessons from the field of American Indian and Indigenous 
Studies.  
Since this paper seeks to tell the Supreme Court what it should rule in the Daniels case, it 
will resemble an amicus brief. Amicus briefs are usually written by parties who have a stake in 
the outcome of a decision. They constitute a submission to the court outlining how a certain 
decision will impact the person or group writing the brief, and can encourage the court to 
consider certain issues when making its ruling. In the same manner, this paper will highlight why 
the lower courts decision was problematic, while also suggesting a more appropriate way 
forward as the Supreme Court considers this question.  
 
Importance of Research 
Since the final decision on this matter has yet to be released, very few scholars have 
studied the Daniels case, which makes this research both timely and important.21 Additionally, 
                                                
21. Ian Peach, and Aaron Mintz, "Daniels v. Canada: The Inevitable Comes to Pass, at Last," Alberta 
Law Review, 50.4 (2013): 883-93, 
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most legal scholarship focuses on the actual decision and its implications, rather than the 
production of that decision.22 Very few scholars review other judges’ reasoning in depth, and as 
such, act in a similar manner as a higher court judge tasked with reviewing a lower court 
decision and the reasoning behind their ruling. Therefore, this research will be unique in that it 
will analyze the discussion that went into producing the Daniels decision rather than simply 
looking at the Daniels decision. As this paper will later highlight, analyzing the reasoning behind 
a ruling is extremely important. In this case, it will reveal that, despite coming to the proper 
conclusion, further analysis will show that these conclusions were made using an improper 
method and reasoning.     
Additionally, very few scholars write a suggestion on what courts should rule, outside of 
submitting amicus briefs in hearings. Most scholars, instead, evaluate court rulings once they are 
released. As such, not many scholars conduct work on an ongoing case. Thus, this research will 
be unique because it is timely, and not much work has been done on this case as it is still going 
through the court system. 
Lastly, while many legal scholars have analyzed cases of Aboriginal law, and while many 
scholars of American Indian and Indigenous Studies (AIIS) have written about the legal status of 
Indigenous Peoples and the importance of certain court decisions, not a lot of work has been 
done that incorporates the methods, concepts, and lessons from both fields into one piece of 
                                                
http://www.heinonline.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/alblr50&div=45&start_
page=871&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=0&men_tab=srchresults; Paul Chartrand, “Commentary: 
Understanding the Daniels case on s. 91(24) Constitution Act 1867,” Aboriginal Policy Studies, 3.3 
(2014): 115-131, http://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/aps/article/view/22231; Larry Chartrand, 
"Failure of the Daniels Case: Entrenching a Colonial Legacy," Alberta Law Review, 15.1 (2013-2014): 
181-90, 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/alblr51&div=12&start_page=181&collection
=journals&set_as_cursor=1&men_tab=srchresults.  
22. Anderson, 136. 
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scholarship. Therefore, this research will be unique as it will bridge together these two fields to 
create a piece of legal scholarship that incorporates the methods and lessons from AIIS.  
 
Goals and Intended Audience 
As not been much work has been done on this pivotal case for Métis People, many 
Canadians have been misinterpreting the Daniels case.23 Therefore, this paper will serve as an 
important source of information on the Daniels case for Métis and non-Métis alike. However, as 
one of the main goals of scholarship in American Indian and Indigenous Studies is to serve a 
purpose for the communities it studies, this research’s main purpose is that it be useful for Métis 
individuals, Métis communities and Métis self-governments. 24 This paper seeks to show Métis 
People how the Canadian court system is currently conceptualizing their identity, and how this 
decision can potentially impact the Metis. While court documents can be lengthy and 
disengaging, this paper hopes have done the work of analyzing court documents in the Daniels 
and deciphering what they mean for Métis People, so that Métis People can feel engaged and 
involved in the Daniels conversation. As such, this paper hopes to encourage Métis People to 
think critically about how the courts and the parties involved in the Daniels case are thinking 
about the Métis. In this sense, this paper is intended to serve as a resource to the average citizen.  
This paper seeks to do more however, than to simply serve as a resource on the Daniels 
case. As scholarship in AIIS is also intended to serve as potential policy prescriptions, this 
scholarship seeks to also speak to a legal audience.25 In answering the Daniels question, this 
                                                
23. See Chartrand, “Commentary: Understanding the Daniels case on s. 91(24) Constitution Act 
1867.” 
24. Champagne, Duane. "Is American Indian Studies for Real?" Wicazo Sa Review, 23.2 (2008): 81-
84, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30131263.pdf  
25. Ibid., 86-87.  
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paper will put forth a more accurate way to think of the Métis in Canadian law, through 
incorporating methods from both the legal field and the field of AIIS. Thus, this paper will serve 
as an example to show judges, justices, lawyers and legal scholars how to effectively incorporate 
the teachings of AIIS in a legal setting and in legal debates in order to produce more meaningful, 
respectful and accurate decisions concerning Aboriginal People. In this sense, this paper is also 
intended to speak to a legal audience.   
 
Methodology 
In order to come to the conclusion that the Métis fall under the definition of “Indian” 
under Section 91(24) in a way that puts forth an appropriate understanding of the Métis, a 
specific methodology is necessary. By applying the constitutional interpretation method of the 
“living tree”, while also building on new approaches to understanding Métis identity and staying 
true to the lessons and objectives of AIIS, it is possible to decide this case in a way that will be 
respectful to the Metis.  
First, this research is mainly centered around the analysis of the primary documents 
involved in the Daniels case, which consist of the federal court opinion, the federal court of 
appeals opinion, the webcast of the Supreme Court hearing, and the factums of the parties 
involved, or their summaries of arguments. These documents however, are analyzed through a 
certain methodology that is influenced by scholars of AIIS as well as legal scholars.   
Métis does not mean Mixed 
Métis scholar, Chris Andersen, is particularly useful in providing a certain understanding 
of the Métis that can help answer the Daniels question in a way that will allow for the rejection 
of race in the courts involved in the Daniels case. In his book, “’Métis’: Race, Recognition and 
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the Struggle for Indigenous Peoplehood”, Chris Andersen explains the detriment of the use of 
race and blood in thinking about Indigenous identity, especially for the Métis.   
He begins by showing how race has shaped the common understanding of Indigeneity in 
Canada. From the very beginning of their arrival to Canada, newcomers relied on race to make 
sense of the differences that existed between themselves and the Indigenous Peoples they 
observed.26 Colonizers soon realized they could rely on race to create social classifications where 
Euro-Canadians were viewed to be more superior than Indigenous Peoples, therefore justifying 
the atrocities that would follow as a result of colonization.27  
Over the years, race became the primary way to neatly organize society into groupings. 
Eventually, the idea of racial classifications became permanently ingrained in the minds of 
Canadian officials, citizens, and even in the minds of Indigenous Peoples themselves.28 These 
official classifications became so pervasive that today, Canadians can easily forget that they were 
originally used as a form of power. Most Canadians still believe that racial classifications are 
“just the way things are”, rather than being a social construct that has been used to discriminate 
against certain people.29   
These strict racial classifications have historically confined Indigenous Peoples to a 
certain space, and they continue to do so today. According to these classifications, Indigenous 
Peoples are expected to look according to the racial expectations of their indigenous identities. 30 
By understanding Indigenous identity as a racial identity, Indigenous Peoples are expected to 
demonstrate a certain degree of Indian blood, and to remain pure, or free from white blood.  
                                                
26. Anderson, 29-30.  
27. Ibid., 30. 
28. Ibid., 36-44. 
29. Ibid., 32, 34.  
30. Ibid., 33.  
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Additionally, racialization is a complex practice that can involve classification not only 
along physical differences, but also along cultural differences, such as language, food, religion 
and lifestyle.31 By also understanding this racial classification as a classification beyond 
appearance, Indigenous Peoples are expected to not only look like an Indian, but to also act and 
live like an Indian.  
The racial classification of Indigenous Peoples is especially difficult for the Métis. Under 
this racial understanding of Indigeneity, the Metis have a hard time finding peace. By following 
these definitions of Indigeneity, the Metis are seen as having less Indian blood than other 
Indigenous Peoples, and are also seen as living less as Indians. Under such racial classifications, 
the only logical way the Métis can be understood as Indigenous is by talking about the Métis as a 
“mixed” or “hybrid” people.32 In turn, under this racial definition of Indigeneity, the Metis are 
inevitably seen as less Indigenous than other Indigenous groups. This is because this 
understanding of the Métis as mixed means that the Métis are only one part Indian, and one-part 
white.33 In other words, only the Métis’ Indian part is what allows them to find comfort in this 
racial definition of Indigeneity. Therefore, the Métis appear to be a lot less Indigenous than other 
Indians who are not viewed as mixed, according to a racial understanding of Indigenous identity.   
This understanding of the Métis as mixed has been detrimental to the Métis’ inclusion in 
federal Indian policy. Because Canada has viewed the Métis as one-part white, one-part Indian, it 
has treated the Métis sometimes as Indian, sometimes as white. Moreover, whenever the Métis 
are treated as Indians, this is often more of a symbolic gesture, or an insincere gesture, which 
further highlights the idea that the Metis are not quite Indigenous. As chapter 2 will demonstrate, 
                                                
31. Ibid., 35.  
32. Ibid., 35,36.  
33. Ibid., 39.  
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Canada’s treatment of the Métis as sometimes Indian, sometimes white, has lead to the confusing 
place the Métis have come to occupy in Canadian law.  
Moreover, viewing the Métis as hybrid or mixed creates an assumption that other 
Aboriginal groups in Canada must not be mixed, because if everyone was hybrid, “the term 
would lose its analytical power”.34 This, however, becomes confusing since almost every 
Indigenous person in Canada today can be considered hybrid, or not “pure” under such racial 
classifications of Indian.35  But the Métis still stand out as the least pure Indigenous group, 
perhaps due to the idea that they were created out of contact between Europeans and Indians, 
which challenges the common idea of Indigeneity as predating contact. This dilemma is perfectly 
summed up by a reader’s comment on a news article about the Daniels case who writes, “I am 
torn by this, I am trying to understand how a group of people who literally exist due to 
colonialism, are literally fighting to be treated like some of the most marginalized people in the 
country?”36 Not only does this person’s comment completely miss the fact that the Metis have 
suffered under some of the same detrimental policies as other Indigenous Peoples, and have not 
received any of the programs in place to correct these wrongdoings, but this comment perfectly 
reflects the racial understanding of Indigenous identity that still exists in Canada.37 This 
comment shows that, not only are Metis people viewed as mixed, but that under this 
understanding of the Metis, it is still their “white half” that is more emphasized than their “Indian 
half”. This comment therefore completely denies the Metis’ lineal connection to the first peoples 
                                                
34. Ibid., 39.  
35. Ibid., 39.  
36. See Comments in Karina Roman, "Métis Rights Case Finally before Supreme Court of Canada," 
CBC/Radio Canada, October 8, 2015. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/m%C3%A9tis-rights-case-finally-
before-supreme-court-of-canada-1.3261226  
37. Larry Chartrand, “Métis Identity and Citizenship,” 25.  
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of the Canada. Moreover, it disregards the fact that the metis emerged as a nation in Canada prior 
to the enactment of Canada’s borders.  
By being classified as hybrid, the Métis come to be denied what they seek the most, 
which is “an acknowledgement of our political legitimacy and authenticity as an Indigenous 
People”.38 The Daniels case is after this kind of affirmation of Métis’ authenticity as an 
Indigenous People. Therefore, the only way the Supreme Court will be able to grant the 
plaintiffs’ goals respectfully is if it rejects the racialization of Métis identity as a mixed people.  
Another scholar useful in rejecting the idea of the Métis as mixed is Robert Williams and 
his work in “Savage Anxieties: The Invention of the Western Civilization”. In a similar manner 
to how Chris Andersen traces the use of race to justify the atrocities of colonization, Williams 
traces the view of Indigenous Peoples as savage and backwards, to justify violence, assimilation 
and discrimination towards Indigenous Peoples.39 He begins by showing how this idea of the 
savage originated with the Greeks, who viewed anyone who was different from them as savage. 
He follows this idea to the present day, and shows how Indigenous Peoples are described using 
the same stereotypes even to this day. Similarly to Andersen’s work with race, Williams shows 
how Indigenous Peoples’ differences from Western society which were equated with savageness 
have also been used to serve political purposes, such as the doctrine of discovery, and in federal 
Indian policy in the United States.40 Similar to how we have forgotten the purpose behind race, 
Williams also demonstrates how we have come to internalize our obsessions with viewing 
Indigenous Peoples as different.41 This understanding of Indigenous Peoples as inherently 
                                                
38. Andersen, 38.  
39. Robert A. Williams, Savage Anxieties: The Invention of Western Civilization, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
40. Ibid.,180-217.  
41. Ibid., 223.  
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different than the West has carried over to the modern day. Therefore, when Indigenous Peoples 
are not totally different from western society, their claims to Indigeneity are questioned. Because 
the Métis blended together certain aspects of a “civilized” European society, and of supposedly 
“backwards” Indigenous societies, viewing them as fully Indigenous under this understanding 
again becomes difficult. This is because the Metis have historically shared many similarities to 
the “civilized” European society, and continue to do so today, therefore making them not entirely 
different from the West. Instead of being viewed a civilized or savage, the Métis, being 
understood as mixed, were instead viewed as half-savage, half-civilized, excluding them from 
either side of this binary.42  
Linda Tihuwai Smith provides another way to understand Williams’ critique, but 
explaining how Indigenous Peoples are typically conceptualized as “the Other.” Just as a racial 
understanding of Indigeneity creates a situation where the Metis occupy a confusing place 
between the binaries of white and Indian, or of civilized and savage, so does an understanding of 
Indigenous Peoples as the Other. The Metis occupy a confusing space in the definition of 
Indigeneity as the Other, as they do not fit in either binary of the West or the Other.  
As this paper will later show, the Canadian government and the court system interpreting 
the Daniels case still rely on these problematic ideas of indigenous identity. In doing so, they 
may still come to the conclusion that the Métis are section 91(24) Indians, but they will 
inevitably put forth a declaration that finds the Métis to be less Indigenous than other Indigenous 
groups in Canada. Understanding why these ideas of Indigeneity are problematic will be useful 
in not only determining why the lower courts’ understanding of the Metis was problematic, but 
                                                
42. Teillet, 1-5.  
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to also suggest a Supreme Court ruling that will put forth a more respectful and accurate view of 
the Métis.  
American Indian and Indigenous Studies 
Also essential to successfully answering the Daniels question are the lessons, goals and 
values from the field of American Indian and Indigenous Studies. These lessons from the field of 
AIIS work to push back certain problematic ideas, stereotypes, and misconceptions about 
Indigenous Peoples and provide a framework to conduct respectful research on Indigenous 
Peoples.  
The first important lesson from the field of AIIS is an understanding that at the center of 
Indigenous identity is belonging to an Indigenous nation. Scholars of AIIS have to wrestle with 
the complex question of Indigenous identity which can revolve around race, culture and 
community acceptance, but fundamental to almost all Indigenous identities is an understanding 
of Indigenous identity as a political identity, or a national identity.43 While Indigenous Peoples 
have always maintained their unique status as nations, this understanding of Indigenous identity 
is not always present in scholarship, in society, or in the law.   
A second important lessons from the field of AIIS is that scholarship about Indigenous 
Peoples should include indigenous perspectives. Linda Tahuwai Smith argues that Indigenous 
Peoples have been too complacent in allowing Indigenous histories and research on Indigenous 
Peoples to be told by western perspectives.44 She calls for research that puts forth Indigenous 
perspectives and thus, restores a sense of agency to Indigenous Peoples in their own histories.45 
                                                
43. Clara S. Kidwell, "American Indian Studies: Intellectual Navel Gazing or Academic Discipline?" 
American Indian Quarterly, 33.1 (2009): 5-10, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25487916.pdf?_=1459475314579  
44. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, (London: 
Zed, 1999), 33. 
45. Ibid., 28-29.  
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DeMallie adds to this by saying how, “if we are to understand history as a lived reality, it is 
important to understand the perspectives of the actors involved”. 46 By presenting more 
Indigenous perspectives in research about Indigenous Peoples, scholarship in AIIS can counter 
common stereotypes and misconceptions surrounding Indigenous Peoples and their histories. 
This lesson is especially important for research conducted on the Daniels case, as the entire case 
and debate has thus far, largely ignored Métis perspectives about Metis history and Metis 
identity. 
Another important lesson from the field of AIIS is that it is important to also study 
Indigenous Peoples in the present. It wasn’t until Vine Deloria called out Anthropologists and 
researchers for their appalling representation of Indigenous Peoples as savage and backwards in 
his pivotal book “Custer Died for your Sins” that scholarship on Indigenous peoples moved away 
from representing Indigenous Peoples as primitive, savage, backwards, and violent.47 Along with 
including more Indigenous perspectives in scholarship, one of the main ways AIIS has countered 
this problem is through not only focusing on Indigenous Peoples of the past, but by also placing 
emphasis on Indigenous Peoples of today. As such, AIIS becomes an opportunity for Indigenous 
Peoples to correct the way they have been misrepresented in scholarship and in history. As this 
paper will later show, this lesson from AIIS is particularly useful in interpreting the Daniels case 
which has mostly focused on the Métis people of the past, and has therefore, perpetuated the 
ideas of Indigenous Peoples as uncivilized, backwards and savage.  
                                                
46. Raymond J Demallie, ""These Have No Ears": Narrative and the Ethnohistorical Method," 
Ethnohistory, 40.4 (1993): 526, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/482586.pdf?_=1459394527555. 
47. Vine Deloria, Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto, (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 
78-100.  
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One last aspect of AIIS that is particularly useful for research on the Daniels case is that 
AIIS seeks to “decolonize” scholarship.48 This task, though seemingly simple, can be extremely 
difficult because colonialism has also come to manifest itself in Indigenous Peoples’ minds, as is 
apparent through the continued use of race in defining Indigenous identity. This is especially true 
for the Métis, who have always been told they are a mixed people, and as a result, have come to 
internalize this colonial view of their identity as a mixed people.49 Thus, by rejecting the idea of 
Métis identity as a racial identity, this work will attempt to follow the goal of AIIS in producing 
decolonial scholarship. Jack Forbes and Raymond Demallie add to this by writting about the 
purpose of American Indian Studies as a liberation of Indigenous thought, or as an outlet for 
non-western thought. DeMallie writes about AIIS as as an outlet for Indigenous thinking, which 
typically differs significantly from “western” ideas.50 Forbes adds to this by writing about how 
American Indian Studies was created as a means for “intellectual self determination,” by which 
Indigenous scholars have authority on scholarship that is about them.51 This work will serve as a 
liberation of Indigenous thought through incorporating an understanding of the Métis that tries to 
rid itself of colonial influences. This work will also achieve a liberation of Indigenous thought 
through incorporating these teachings from the field of AIIS into a legal method of scholarship 
that has thus far, remained focused on western norms of scholarship and of the law. The last part 
of this methodology is what will allow for the incorporation of these lessons in AIIS into a legal 
analysis, as well as allow for a proper understanding of Métis identity in the Daniels question.  
Background on the Living Tree Approach 
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The concept of the living tree in constitutional interpretation first appeared in Canadian 
constitutional law in 1929, in Edwards v. Canada, also known as the “Persons case”. The 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which at the time was the highest level of court in 
Canada, overturned the Supreme Court’s ruling that women were not considered to be persons 
under Section 24 of the the 1867 Constitution Act.52 In Edwards, the federal government as the 
respondent to the action, relied on a similar originalist interpretation as it did in the Daniels case. 
In the Daniels case, the federal government asserts that the framers never intended for the Metis 
to be considered Section 91(24) Indians. Similarly, in Edwards, Canada argued that women 
could not be included in the definition of persons because the framers, when writing the 
Constitution, never intended for the word persons to include women.53  
However, Justice Sankey rejected Canada’s originalist argument, saying that, while the 
constitution needed to maintain integrity and consistency, the Constitution Act of 1867 “planted 
in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”.54 He found 
that times had drastically changed since 1867, when women were not allowed to hold a seat in 
the senate, and consequently, the constitution should be able to grow and change in accordance 
with the times to allow women to hold senate positions.55 In writing the Edwards opinion, Justice 
Sankey established the legacy of the living tree doctrine in Canadian constitutional 
interpretation. 
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Another case that is recognized for further developing the living tree doctrine in Canada 
is the Reference on Same-Sex Marriage, decided by the Supreme Court in 2004. Here the 
Supreme Court had to determine whether the definition of marriage under Section 91(26) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 could be interpreted to include marriage between two people of the same 
sex. Again the federal government made its argument based on an originalist interpretation of the 
provision. It argued that the framers of the Constitution would not have intended to include 
marriage between people of the same-sex when they wrote the Constitution.56 Chief Justice 
Beverly McLaughin, the same Chief Justice who will decide the Daniels case, rejected this 
originalist interpretation of Section 91(26) arguing that, “the ‘frozen concept’ reasoning runs 
contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation,” 
namely that the Constitution should be allowed to change as society progresses.57   
Instead, Justice McLaughin depended on a similar living tree interpretation put forth by 
Justice Skaney. She stated that “our Constitution is a living tree [...], which accommodates and 
addresses the realities of modern life.”58 As Chief Justice McLaughin found, times had changed 
since the creation of the Constitution, when marriage was considered to be the union between a 
man and a women, and therefore the meaning of marriage in the constitution needed to 
accommodate this reality. These cases demonstrate how, in some instances, it may be 
inappropriate to rely on the intention of the framers who wrote the Constitution in 1867. Instead, 
it is sometimes necessary to interpret the constitution flexibly, and to allow it to progress as 
society progresses.  
Defining a Living Tree Approach 
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While it may seem that Canada has a long tradition of relying on the living tree doctrine, 
this method of constitutional interpretation has not yet been thoroughly developed by Canadian 
courts.59 While most lawyers, judges and scholars favor the implementation of a living tree 
approach in principle,  it has been easier for them to “recite metaphors instead of actually 
developing the Doctrine”.60 While the Same-Sex and the Persons case provide an idea of what a 
living tree approach entails, a clear methodology of the doctrine is still lacking. There is no 
single definition of the living tree approach, when it should be used, or how it should be applied. 
To add to this, many different scholars of constitutional law have put forth different and at times 
contradictory definitions of a living tree approach.61 Thus, the task of defining a living tree 
approach is not an easy one.  
However, many legal scholars and justices have developed certain aspects of a definition 
for a living tree approach. Together, these main proponents of the living tree approach can help 
provide a clearer picture of this method of constitutional interpretation. This next section will 
rely on these scholars to formulate a framework needed in order to implement the living tree 
approach. The following section will then formulate a framework for applying the living tree 
interpretation to a particular question of constitutional interpretation.  
When to use the Living Tree Approach 
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The first indication that a living tree interpretation is necessary is the most obvious; there 
has to have been a significant change in society to allow for a deviation from the original intent 
of the framers.62 Comparable to the Persons case and the Same-Sex case, there has to be a clear 
indication that society has progressed from the time the constitution was written regarding the 
specific constitutional provision at question. As Justice McLaughin wrote, the constitution is like 
a living tree, capable of accommodating new realities.63 Therefore, in order to rely on the living 
tree approach, there has to exist some kind of new reality in society, that was not there in 1867.  
The living tree approach should be used in “times vastly different from those in which 
[the Constitution] was crafted”.64 However, defining the type of change or new realities needed 
is a bit more difficult. There may be new technological advances made from the time the framers 
were writing, which creates a new subject matter now needing to be placed under either the 
federal or the provincial government’s jurisdiction.65 It may also be that society has progressed 
and now holds different morals than those held by the framers in 1867.66 However, for courts to 
rely on a living tree approach, it does not matter what type of change occurred. Rather, all that is 
necessary is that the framers could not have anticipated such change while writing in 1867, and 
could therefore, not have created a constitutional provision with such changes in mind.67 
Second, a living tree approach must be relied on when the intention of the framer’s has 
been addressed and it is determined that there is danger in interpreting a constitutional provision 
with reference to such original intentions, as the court found in both the Persons case and the 
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Same-Sex case.68 In Persons and the Same-Sex case, both courts made the realization that 
society’s views regarding women and same-sex couples had progressed from the time the 
Constitution was drafted, and the framers who were writing in 1867 could not have anticipated 
such change in societal morals.  
The last reason to warrant a living tree approach is a consideration of the norms of 
international law. There has been a greater movement in the United States and in Canada to 
consider international law to suggest the implementation of a living tree approach, particularly in 
cases regarding human rights.69 Therefore, not only should courts consider how the intentions of 
the framers compare to modern-day realities of their own society, but courts should also consider 
how the intentions of the framers compare to the norms of international law. If the norms of 
international law are inconsistent with a an originalist interpretation of the provision called into 
question, this should further the need for a living tree approach, particularly when these 
international laws apply to Canada, even if in a non-binding way.70 
Applying a Living Tree Approach 
First, a living tree approach requires a broad interpretation of the language involved in 
the constitutional provision. Constitutional law Professor Peter Hogg writes that in a living tree 
interpretation, “the language is to be given a ‘progressive interpretation’ so that it is to 
continuously adapt to new conditions and new ideas”.71 By relying on a progressive 
interpretation of the language, we allow for a constitution that is seemingly stuck in time to have 
life like a tree, through the judge’s interpretation of text of the Constitution.72 This however, does 
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not mean that judges can simply change the linguistic meaning of a constitutional provision. 
Rather this means that through undertaking a progressive interpretation of the language, the legal 
rule that is drawn from the written words of a constitution can change.73 Put otherwise, words 
cannot simply be replaced with new words, but just as certain words’ meanings can change over 
time, the way to interpret the words of a constitutional provision can change through different 
legal actions such as this one.  
Second, a living tree approach must still somewhat rely on a purposive approach to 
constitutional interpretation.74 This requires any constitutional interpretation to be in line with 
the overall purpose of the provision. This does not mean that a living tree approach must rely on 
the original intent of the framers.75 In the contrary, the original intent should be rejected when it 
is deemed to be inconsistent with modern-day realities. Rather, this means that the overarching 
purpose of the provision, or the interests which it was meant to protect, should be considered in 
applying a living tree approach.76 The metaphor of the living tree works well to explain this 
concept. While a tree can grow taller and move with the wind, it is still limited in its movement 
because it has roots that keep it firmly planted in the ground.77 In other words, a constitution 
should be seen as a living document, but it should not move too far away from its original 
overarching goals.  
Lastly, when interpreting a constitution from a living tree method, the court should 
consider the general perceptions of society on the matter at hand.78 Aileen Kavanagh suggests 
that, while judges are not obligated to poll public opinions and make sure that their decisions are 
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perfectly in line with the popular beliefs of morality in society, it would be wrong for judges to 
ignore any new moral developments and moral realities. Instead, she says “judges should be in 
tune with moral development and moral change”.79 
The lower courts involved in the Daniels question did not apply a living tree approach 
and instead relied on an originalist interpretation of Section 91(24). However, now the Supreme 
Court has the opportunity to take advantage of the living tree approach while interpreting the 
Daniels question. If it does so, it will be able to incorporate a more accurate understanding of 
Métis identity in coming to the conclusion that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians.  
Before turning to the Daniels case, the next chapter will consist of a historical overview 
of the Métis’ treatment under Canadian law, where a racial classification of the Métis was used 
to justify Métis’ inconsistent treatment as Indian by the federal government. Chapter 3 will 
highlight the problems with the Daniels case. It will show how the lower courts’ approach to the 
Daniels question was not a significant movement away from the Métis’ treatment as either Indian 
or white based an understanding of the Metis as mixed. Chapter 4 will then answer the Daniels 
question by showing how a living tree approach can find that the Métis are Section 91(24) 
Indians while rejecting the racialization of Métis identity. Chapter 5 will consist of the 
conclusion, which will reiterate the findings of this research, as well as suggest areas for further 
research.  
 
 
Chapter 2  
A Brief History of the Metis in Federal Indian Policy 
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Canadian Federal Indian Policy can be complex since there is not one single rule book to 
determine how the Canadian government interacts with Aboriginal Peoples. Instead, different 
statutes enacted at different moments in Canada history together create the rulebook of Canadian 
Indian Policy. Often times, these statutes may specify different and even contradicting rules for 
the governance of Canada’s Aboriginal People. This is true regarding Métis’ inclusion as Indians 
in various statues. Some statues include the Métis as Indian, others exclude the Métis, and some 
statues do not specify who they mean by Indian. At times, Métis’ inclusion in these statutes was 
because of their racial similarities to Indians, other times it was because it would help Canada 
achieve its own goals and motivations, and sometimes, it was a mix of both. However, because 
the Canadian government held a racial view of the Métis as mixed, it could easily justify its 
treatment of the Métis as either Indian or white.  
This Chapter will trace the history of Métis’ status under Canadian law through looking 
at six statutes that provide a glimpse into Canada’s insincere treatment of the Métis as Indians. It 
is important to note that this chapter will focus on how the Métis have been defined in Canadian 
law, and not how they have historically self-identified. This chapter is aimed at highlighting 
Canada’s inconsistent treatment of the Métis as Indian, which is not always consistent with how 
the Métis thought of themselves. 
 
Terminology 
Before outlining Métis’ inconsistent inclusion in Federal Indian Policy, it is important to 
highlight some of the meanings behind key terms that will appear frequently throughout this 
chapter, as well as in other chapters. First, it is important to note that the word Indian will refer to 
the the term as it appears in legal statutes, or as it appeared in Canadian society around the time it 
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was created, and not as it would be used in today’s society. Canada for the most part, has 
abolished the use of the word Indian in governmental agency titles, in textbooks, and scholarly 
publications.80 Instead, modern terminology requires the use of the word “First-Nations” when 
referring to Status-Indians, meaning Indians who have status under the Indian Act, or who were 
given reservations.81 Additionally, the word “Aboriginal” is used when referring to the three 
main groups considered to make up Canada’s Aboriginal People; the Inuit, First Nations, and the 
Métis.82 However, Indian is still the term used in most legal statutes, as most statutes were 
enacted when more specific terms like Aboriginal or First-Nations were not yet commonplace.  
When the framers created Section 91(24) they did not specify who they meant by the 
word Indian. This becomes confusing however, because the word Indian in 91(24) could have 
been used to either refer only to First-Nations People, or to refer to all Aboriginal People, namely 
the Inuit, the Metis and First-Nations. In some statutes where the Métis and/or perhaps the Inuit 
are included under the definition of Indian, the word Indian can be read almost synonymously 
with the current term Aboriginal, but in other statutes only meant to include Status-Indians, the 
word Indian can be read synonymously with the modern term First-Nations. For instance, the 
Indian Act only applies to First-Nation individuals, and thus the word Indian as it appears in the 
Act can be interpreted as we now use First-Nations, or Status Indians. Where there is no 
specification of who is and is not included as Indian, there is still ongoing debate. This is the case 
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with the Constitution Act of 1867, and the main issue behind the Daniels case, which the next 
two chapters will tackle.  
 
Early Federal Indian Policy 
This first section will address the treatment of the Métis in early federal Indian policy, 
through considering the Manitoba Act, 1870 and the Scrip System. In these statutes, the Métis 
were treated more similarly to Indians because it allowed for Canada to further its goals of 
extinguishing Métis’ claim to Indian Title in order to accelerate its settlement of the West.  
 
Treaties 
The mid-nineteenth century in early Indian policy in Canada was characterized by what 
was known as the “Numbered Treaties,” where Indigenous collectives ceded their lands to the 
Dominion of Canada in return for food, education, medical treatments, reserved lands, or cash 
payments.83 For the Dominion of Canada, these treaties served the purpose of peacefully 
transferring Indian lands to the Crown, in order to open up Indigenous lands for European 
settlement.84 While the Crown never formally signed any treaties with Métis collectives, in 
certain circumstances half breed individuals could be included in treaties signed between the 
Crown and First-Nations, if for example, a half breed resided on a reservation, or practiced an 
“Indian lifestyle.”85  
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These Métis individuals who resided on reservations with Status-Indians presented a 
unique challenge to the Crown who had not anticipated dealing with half breeds in drafting 
treaties with First-Nations. Prior to drafting treaties, Crown officials were sent to different First-
Nations communities to determine their willingness to enter into a treaty with the Crown. In an 
1849 report documenting these visits, Vidal and Anderson came across half breeds, and reported 
the following: 
“Another subject which may involve a difficulty is that of determining how far Half 
breeds are to be regarded as having a claim to share in the remuneration awarded to 
the Indians, and (as they can scarcely be altogether excluded without injustice to 
some) where and how the distinction should be made between them: -many of these 
are so closely connected.”86 
These Métis individuals presented an extra obstacle in the Crown’s mission to open up 
Indigenous lands for settlement through treaties, because these Métis individuals too were 
demanding land rights similar to what was being promised to First-Nations through treaty-
making. In order to successfully fulfill these goals of opening up Indian lands for settlement, the 
Crown had no choice but to deal with the half breeds residing on First-Nation reservations. As 
such, the treatment of these Métis individuals as Indian during the treaty-making period with 
First-Nations was not made genuinely. Instead, the Dominion of Canada saw this as the only 
appropriate response to successfully negotiate treaties with Indian groups, to successfully 
continue the settlement of Indigenous lands. Since the Dominion possessed this common 
understanding of the Metis as mixed, it could easily justify Metis’ inclusion under the treatment 
of Indians in treaty-making. Especially since in these cases, through thinking of the Métis as half 
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breeds, Métis’ “Indian half” was much more obvious than their “white half”. This treatment of 
the Metis as Indians further reveals Canada’s use of race in thinking about Metis identity. 
Surveyors who came across these half breeds could barely distinguish them from Status-Indians, 
and as such, were less confused about the Metis occupying a position in between the binary of 
white and Indian. Instead, these Metis were more racially similar to Status-Indians, likely in their 
appearance, but also in their lifestyle, as they resided in First-Nation communities.  
The Manitoba Act, 1870 
While certain Metis individuals were treated as Indian during the treaty-making period, it 
was not until 1870 during the creation of the province of Manitoba, that the Métis were treated as 
an Indian collective by the new Canadian government. This was the first statute in which the 
Métis were treated as Indian through being regarded as having “Indian Title,” even though this 
treatment was not genuine.  
When a prominent Métis leader, Louis Riel, heard of plans to transfer Hudson Bay 
Company lands to the Canadian government without consulting the Métis, he organized a 
provisional government to protest against these actions.87 The Métis, who made up a majority in 
these lands, insisted that they be treated like Indians and that lands to be set aside for them as 
part of their claim to Indian Title. They also requested certain provisions that would ensure the 
representation of Métis leaders in the provincial legislature, as well as certain provisions that 
could guarantee the protection of Métis language and culture.88 In response, Canada agreed to 
negotiate with the Métis.  
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The negotiations eventually culminated in the Manitoba Act, 1870, which created the 
province of Manitoba as the fourth province of Canada.89 On July 15 1870, during this transfer of 
lands from the possession of Hudson’s Bay Company to Canada, the Manitoba Act stipulated 
that 14 million acres of land would be set aside “for the benefit of families of half-breed 
residents.”90 Additionally, Section 31 of the Act also reflected Métis-Canada negotiations during 
the transfer, as it promised to distribute 2.5 millions acres of lands to the Métis.91  
Such provisions were enacted under the belief that like Indians, the Métis had a claim to 
Indian title.92 But, unlike their Indian neighbors, the promises made to the Métis for their 
compensation of Indian Title were never delivered in full. In fact, the federal officials who 
signed the Act may have never intended to fulfill its ambitious promises to the Métis.93 Evidence 
from these negotiations suggests that the Federal Government was not signing the Manitoba Act 
as a genuine act of recognition of Métis rights, but rather as a way to prevent a potential Métis 
uprising, and to ensure Canada could peacefully expand into the West.94 Recognizing Métis’ 
claim to Indian Title was Canada’s last obstacle preventing it from its expansion out West.95   
Therefore, while the Métis were treated as Indians throughout the creation of the province 
of Manitoba, this treatment was not necessarily because Canada genuinely viewed the Métis as 
Indian, but rather because it was the most convenient way to deal with the Métis. Canada’s first 
prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, during an address to the Canadian Parliament on July 
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6th, 1885 expressed this himself when he said, “ Whether they [the Métis] had any right to lands 
or not was not so much the question as it was a question of policy, to make an arrangements with 
the inhabitants of the province.”96 As this promise of lands to the Metis was an ad hoc policy 
only to free up Metis lands, Canada likely did not have the sincere intentions to fulfill such 
promises. This meant that Canada needed to come up with a convenient way to dodge its 
responsibility to the Metis, whilst also keeping the Métis quiet in order to continue engaging in a 
peaceful seizing of Indigenous lands to settle the West.  
Scrip 
The common way to deliver promises associated with an acknowledgment of Indian Title 
was through treaty-making, as Canada did with First-Nations Peoples in order to extinguish their 
claims to Indian Title. Since the Crown had recognized that the Métis had a claim to Indian Title, 
it also offered individual Métis the choice to accept treaty.97 However, most Métis did not accept 
treaty like their First-Nations neighbors since they were heavily encouraged by the federal 
government to instead take scrip.98 The scrip system would serve as a way for the federal 
government to act as though it was delivering the promises made to the Métis for compensation 
of their claim to Indian Title, without having to actually fully deliver such promises.  
Today, the Métis are the only Aboriginal group in Canada today without a designated 
land-base, contrary to the First-Nations who were given reservations as lands that would be 
protected from further encroachment, and to the Inuit for whom Nunavut was created to give 
them more control over natural resources and their own governance.99 This however, is not 
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because the Métis did not have a homeland and were not promised a certain portion of that 
homeland. The Canadian government had promised the Métis land grants through Section 31 of 
the Manitoba Act, 1870, as part of Métis’ claim to Indian Title, but never delivered these 
promises.100 Instead, the Métis were promised to receive their compensation for their Indian Title 
through the issuance of scrip.  
The issuance of scrip, or of “Half Breed Land Grants,” had the same end goal as the 
numbered treaties; to secure Indian lands for settlement.101 Canada realized that the scrip system 
would be the quickest way to conclude the treaty-making period and open up public lands for 
large-scale settlement of the West. As such, the Métis were often coerced into taking scrip 
instead of entering into a treaty with Canada.102  
Contrary to the numbered treaties signed with First-Nations, Canada took a more 
individualistic approach with the Métis. Canada promised the Métis their share of Indian Title 
through individual land grants, even though the Métis had made collective claims to Indian Title. 
The Dominion issued half breed grants, or scrip, to Métis individuals by providing them with a 
simple piece of paper resembling a coupon. A scrip coupon was redeemable for either 240 
dollars or 240 acres of lands, and so the individual could choose whether to accept a cash 
payment or a land payment for compensation of their claim to Indian Title. When individuals 
accepted 240 acres of lands however, they did not have a choice in selecting their lands, as they 
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came from specifically set aside lands that were often very far from Métis homelands, and often 
not as rich in resources as the original lands the Métis inhabited.103  
Additionally, the process for Métis individuals to redeem either dollars or lands from 
their scrip coupons was extremely lengthy and bureaucratic.104 Even when Métis individuals did 
receive their lands, the Métis were only able to sell them for a fraction of their worth, allowing 
settlers to profit off of Métis scrip lands.105 As a result of this policy, many Métis were forced 
into poverty, and many Métis communities were broken up.  
Since Canada’s priorities during the issuance of scrip was mainly to free up Métis lands 
for settlement, once it had done so, issuing the monies or lands to the Métis was no longer a main 
priority. As a result, the process of administering lands or payments to the Métis was drawn out, 
and many Métis individuals never even saw the lands they were promised.106 The failure of the 
scrip system was no coincidence however, considering the fact that Canada saw the recognition 
of Métis’ claim to Indian Title purely as a strategic move and likely never had the intentions to 
fulfil these promises to the Métis.  
Both the Métis and First-Nations Peoples suffered a loss of identity and land rights during 
the early days of Canadian Federal Indian policy, as the goals of Indian policy at this time were 
to extinguish Indian Title in order to begin an accelerated settlement of the West.107 However, 
contrary to First-Nations and Inuit People, the Métis were never fully afforded even the small 
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benefits that came with the recognition of having Indian Title. This is because Canada viewed 
the Métis as Indian enough to have a claim to Indian Title when this would benefit Canada, but 
not Indian enough to be deserving of the actual benefits associated with having a valid claim to 
Indian Title.  
 
Later Federal Indian Policy 
While the Métis had been viewed as Indian in early Indian Policy, even though not 
genuinely, a shift occurred in the inclusion of the Métis as Indians with the creation of new 
statutes. With the creation of the Indian Act, and later under the Constitution Act, 1867, the Métis 
came to be explicitly excluded in the definition of the term Indian under Federal Indian policy. 
Again, Canada’s position to exclude the Métis from the term Indian in these statutes was not a 
genuine consideration of the Métis as Indian, but part of a strategic plan.  
Indian Act 1876 
The first explicit legal definition of the word Indian to clearly exclude the Métis appeared 
in the Indian Act, 1876. The Indian Act came together as a consolidation of many separate acts 
that were enacted prior to the creation of Canada in 1867, which outlined separate areas of 
treatment and governance of the Indian population.108 The new consolidated Indian Act did not 
contain any substantive changes from its earlier statutes, other than it came to explicitly exclude 
the Métis and Inuit from the definition of Indian altogether.109 The Act specifically declared that 
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anyone who had received scrip, as well as their descendants, could not be considered to have 
status under the Indian Act.110   
Prior to the consolidation of the Indian Act, the Métis had been considered to be Indian 
under many earlier versions of the Act.111 For example, the first statute enacted by the Dominion 
of Canada which included the word Indian was the 1868 Secretary of State Act, which defined 
Indians as all people of Indian blood and their descendants.112 Under this description, there was 
no distinction made between Indians and half breeds, which is not surprising considering the fact 
that the Métis were then referred to as half breeds, and therefore, still considered to have some 
Indian blood.113  
What drove the inclusion or exclusion of the Métis under the Act however, was Canada’s 
own motivations. When the Canadian government needed to exert power over the Métis, it made 
sure to include them under the Act. For example, in 1884, the Act included a prohibition of 
selling ammunition to First-Nations People and to half breeds. The reason behind the Métis’ 
inclusion in this part of the Act was that the Canadian government felt it should limit the amount 
of arms available to the Métis in order to prevent any potential political uprisings from the 
Métis.114 This would have been a valid concern on behalf of Canada, considering the Métis 
already had a history of rebelling against the federal government when it was unhappy, as it did 
during the Red River Rebellion of 1869-1870.115  
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This deliberate inclusion of the Métis in the Act shows how the Métis were generally 
excluded from the Act, but could easily be included if it was necessary. Later however, the 
definition of Indian in the Act came to shrink significantly to only include Indians who had been 
given reservations, who are now known as First-Nation Indians.116  
The shift in the Act’s broad view of Indians to a narrower one conveniently corresponded 
with the goals of the federal government in relation to Indigenous Peoples at the time in which 
these definitions of Indian were produced. For example, the very first statutes which would later 
come together to form the Indian Act usually applied to all those with any level of Indian blood 
and their descendants.117 At the same time, one the Act’s early purpose was to assimilate or 
civilize Indians, which is evident through the titles of these early Acts, which include “The 
Civilization of Indian Tribes Act of 1857.”118 Consequently, it would have made sense to want to 
assimilate the Métis, as the Canadian government viewed them as not entirely Indian, but not 
entirely white either, and therefore, in need of assimilation to become “fully civilized men.”119  
Around the mid 1900s, Canada began to realize that it had not been successful in 
assimilating the Indians.120 In 1951, the Act started to correct it’s old assimilationist and 
paternalistic ways and repealed some of its most assimilationist provisions.121  Eventually, as the 
Act turned into more of a rulebook meant to dictate Canada’s governance of Indians and their 
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reservations, the definition of Indian began to narrow. This was because the Act finally required 
Canada to fulfil certain responsibilities towards its Indian population.122 As a result, it would 
have been strategic for Canada to exclude the Métis from the Act, so that it could limit the 
amount of people it had to specifically govern and provide services to. For this reason, despite 
being included as Indian in earlier version of the Indian Act, the Métis people eventually came to 
be excluded altogether from the Act.123 What allowed for this inconsistent treatment of the Métis 
as Indian was the idea that the Métis were mixed. Since the Métis were not quite Indian but not 
quite white, Canada could either include or exclude the Métis from the Act, depending on what 
would yield a greater benefit to Canada.  
While the Indian Act was meant to outline Canada’s governance of Indians, Canadian 
Indian Policy is not only contained in one document. Other aspects of the rulebook are contained 
elsewhere. The Constitution Act, 1867 also defines certain aspects of Federal Indian policy. 
Indigenous groups not considered to be Indian under the Indian Act could be considered Indian 
within the Constitution and vice-versa. Therefore, it is important to look at how the Métis are 
defined in the Canadian Constitution.124  
Constitution Act, 1867 
The Constitution Act, 1867, originally known as the British North American Act, was 
passed by the British Parliament in order to create the Dominion of Canada, as it unified the 
three separate colonies of Canada (Quebec and Ontario), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The 
Constitution did not provide any recognition to Indigenous Peoples as the First Peoples of 
Canada or any recognition of Indigenous rights. In fact, Section 91 was the only area in the 
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Constitution with any mention of Indians. Section 91 enumerated a list of subjects over which 
the Canadian federal government had jurisdiction, such as marriage and divorce, the postal 
service, and coasts and fisheries. Within this list is Section 91(24), also known as the Indian 
power, which specifically gives the federal government the exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, 
and Lands Reserved for Indians.”125  
In contrast to the Indian Act which explicitly defines the word Indian, the framers of the 
Constitution never specified what they meant by Indian. As a result, this lack of clarity has been 
used by Canada to justify Métis’ inclusion or exclusion as Indian under Section 91(24). A deeper 
look into the Métis’ inclusion or exclusion within this power reveals that again, Canada justified 
either treatment of the Métis due to its racial view of the Métis as mixed, but what drove this 
inconsistent treatment of the Métis as Indian was Canada’s own goals and motivations at the 
time being.  
Much like the Indian Act, in the earlier years shortly after the creation of Section 91(24), 
the Métis were largely understood to be included as Indian under 91(24), even in practice. For 
example, the year immediately after the creation of s. 91(24), the Secretary of State Act of 1868, 
which was an act recognizing Indian Affairs was thought to include the Métis.126 However, as 
the years progressed, the Canadian government began to argue that the definition of Indian under 
Section 91(24) only included status Indians, and so it maintained that the Métis were the 
responsibility of the provinces.127 During the 1950s, it became clear that the Federal Government 
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was attempting to get rid of some of its responsibilities towards Indians, as it tried to attribute its 
jurisdiction over Indians to the provinces, despite the Constitution Act, 1867 clearly stating that 
Indians are within the jurisdiction of the federal government.128 The only group of Indians that 
Canada seemed to get away in denying that it had jurisdiction over was the Métis.  
Eventually, the Canadian government came to clearly articulate that the Métis were 
officially outside of the federal jurisdictional powers regarding Indians, stating that the Métis 
were the provinces’ responsibility.129 Some provinces welcomed this share of responsibility, and 
began offering services to their Métis population. The most obvious example of a province 
accepting jurisdiction over the Métis was the province of Alberta, who only in 2000, enacted 
legislation that set aside specific lands for the Métis.130 But most provinces maintained that the 
Métis were the Federal government’s responsibility, and that they did not have sufficient funds 
to support their Métis population.131 Not surprisingly so, during the time Canada was the most 
adamant that the Métis did not fall under Section 91(24), the goals of Canadian Indian Policy 
were beginning to change drastically from an era of assimilation and paternalism, to an era where 
Indigenous rights were beginning to be recognized. In accordance with these newer goals, 
Canada needed to provide services and programs to correct the damage it had done to Indigenous 
People, and therefore, it was much more financially beneficial for Canada to reject viewing the 
Métis as Section 91(24) Indians.132 
To this day, the Federal Government continues to argue that the Métis are not specifically 
included as Indian in Section 91(24).133 Much like the Indian Act, Section 91(24) serves as 
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another example in Federal Indian Policy where the Canadian government either included or 
excluded the Métis in this definition of Indian in accordance with its own goals and motivations. 
Again, Canada was able to justify such treatment of the Métis as either Indian or white because 
the Métis were seen as a hybrid of both Indian and whites. The following chapter will explore 
this more in depth, as one of the goals of the Daniels case is to make sense of this inconsistent 
treatment of the Métis under the Indian power.   
 
Recent Federal Indian Policy 
More recently, yet another shift occurred in the definition and treatment of the Métis as 
Indians, this time to explicitly include the Métis as Indians, or rather, as Aboriginal. The creation 
of the new Constitution Act, 1982 specifically included the Métis as falling under the definition 
of “Aboriginal” under its Section 35. Despite this seemingly important shift in the inclusion of 
the Métis in Federal Indian Policy, the Métis still struggle to have the federal government 
recognize their inclusion in this statute.  
Constitution Act, 1982 
The creation of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was talked as a pivotal moment 
in Canadian history, as it was the first time any country gave constitutional recognition to a 
“mixed-blood” people.134 It was also initially seen as a victory for the Métis, as this was the first 
major statute where Métis People were specifically included within the definition of the term 
Aboriginal; a term meant to replace the outdated word of Indian in Canadian Federal Indian 
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Policy.135 This new term helped prevent confusion around who was included under the word 
Indian, as the term was explicitly defined as including the Métis, Indians, and Inuit. Section 35 
reads as follows: 
35 (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
35 (2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and 
Métis peoples of Canada. 136 
In keeping with modern-day goals of Indian Policy meant to promote respect and reconciliation, 
Section 35 was intended to correct the governments’ past practices of denying Aboriginal and 
treaty rights.137 While this was Section 35’s intentions, in reality, Section 35 did not always 
achieve what it was meant to accomplish, especially for the Métis.  
Rather, governments denied that distinct Métis communities existed, and even denied that 
the Métis were Aboriginal.138 Therefore, governments denied the Métis their Aboriginal and 
treaty rights, and denied any legal duties towards the Métis.139 When the Métis asked to meet 
with the Canadian government to define these “existing aboriginal and treaty rights” under 
Section 35, the federal government argued that it did not have federal jurisdiction over the Métis 
under 91(24) and therefore, it could not meet with the Métis.140 As a result, Métis individuals 
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who wanted to exercise their rights under Section 35 usually had to defend their rights in 
court.141 
While the Constitution Act, 1982 was the first statute in which the Métis were specifically 
included under the legal definition of Indian, or Aboriginal, this inclusion was again insincere. 
Much like the Manitoba Act, this inclusion seems like yet again another example of the federal 
government giving lip-service to the Métis by recognizing their status as an Indigenous Peoples, 
but by not fulfilling the promises and responsibilities that come with such recognition. Similar to 
the Manitoba Act, the reason Canada may not feel the need to actually treat the Métis as Indians 
is because it still understands the Métis to be mixed, and therefore views the Métis as not fully 
Indian or Indigenous, and not deserving of the treatment as such.  
In summary, throughout Canada’s history, the Métis have undergone a very inconsistent 
treatment by their colonial government. They were included as Indian in some instances, and 
excluded in others. Moreover, wherever the Métis were viewed as Indian they were never fully 
treated as such. Due to its racial understanding of the Métis as mixed, Canada has been able to 
manipulate the Métis’ identity in order to fulfil its own goals and motivations at the time being. 
These contradicting considerations of the Métis as Indian have lead to the Métis holding a very 
unclear position in federal Indian law and policy today.   
The Daniels case attempts to bring a bit of clarity to all this confusion by determining 
whether the Métis are considered to be Indian under a statute that itself, has inconsistently 
included and excluded the Métis under the definition of Indian. Most importantly however, the 
Supreme Court hearing the Daniels case has the opportunity to correct this treatment of the Métis 
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as mixed, or as sometimes Indian, sometimes white based on Canada’s own goals and 
motivations. However, this understanding of the Métis as mixed still exists today, and the lower 
courts involved in the Daniels case have perpetuated a racial understanding of Indigeneity and of 
the Metis. The pressure now rests on the Supreme Court’s shoulders, to finally correct this 
history.  
 
Chapter 3 
Problems with the Daniels Case 
 
Métis’ inconsistent inclusion in Canadian Federal Indian policy was dependent on 
Canada’s policy and fiscal goals at the time, but was justified by this idea of the Métis being 
mixed, or as one-part Indian, one-part white. In keeping with this theme of flip-flopping, the 
Métis have been inconsistently treated as Indian under 91(24). Again, Canada justified either 
treatment of the Métis as Indian under Section 91(24) through this idea of the Métis as hybrid, 
therefore able of being treated as either Indian or white.  
The Daniels case seeks to uncover whether the Métis are included under this definition of 
the word Indian, in Section 91(24). However, an analysis of conversation generated by the lower 
courts of the Daniels case shows how the Métis are still understood as mixed. This chapter will 
highlight the problems with the Daniels case and with the lower courts’ approach to answering 
the Daniels question. The first part of this chapter will provide an overview of the Daniels case. 
Next, this chapter will highlight the problems with pursuing this matter through the Canadian 
court system. The rest of the paper will highlight the various problems with the court’s 
application of an originalist approach rather than a living tree approach. The first problem with 
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an originalist interpretation is it creates a declaration based on very contradicting evidence. The 
second problem is that it furthers the idea that Section 91(24) is a racial classification. The last 
problem is that the lower courts’ the declaration was based on the treatment of the Métis as 
Indians by their colonial governments which was dependent on furthering the motivations and 
self-interest of the Confederation. While the Judges came to the right conclusion, their approach 
was flawed. All of these problems together will show how the lower courts’ declaration rests on 
an unstable foundation and one that is not appropriate for a modern-day court decision.  
 
Background on the Daniels Case 
There are only three areas within the Canadian Constitution that mention Canada’s 
Aboriginal Peoples.142 Section 91(24) of the Canadian Constitution, also known as the “Indian 
power”, is one of those three areas. The Indian power gives the federal government the exclusive 
jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians”, though the word Indian is not 
defined.143 The second mention of Indigenous Peoples is Section 25. In 1982, Canada created the 
Constitution Act of 1982. Section 25 of the Constitution Act of 1982 provides the guarantee that 
other aspects of the Constitution cannot take away any Aboriginal, treaty or other rights or 
freedoms that pertain to the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada. The third mention of Indigenous 
Peoples is in Section 35 which reads, “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
Peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Section 35 also explicitly defined that 
by “aboriginal persons” it means, “the Indian, Métis and Inuit Peoples of Canada”.144  
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While the Constitution Act, 1982 was the first document providing specific recognition to 
the Métis, since its creation, the Métis have struggled to prove their “existing aboriginal rights”, 
at times, needing to defend them in the Canadian court system.145 For years now, the Métis have 
attempted to meet with the federal government to discuss and define their Section 35 rights, as 
well as to discuss a path towards reconciliation. However, the federal government continued to 
deny its ability to even meet with the Métis, by saying that it does not have the federal 
jurisdiction over the Métis, since the Métis are not Indians under Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution.146 
Frustrated with constantly not having a place at the table when it comes to discussions 
about reconciliation between Canada and its Indigenous population, Harry Daniels, a prominent 
Métis leader, began this action in 1999. The purpose behind his action was to seek a clarification 
on whether the Métis are included under Section 91(24) of the Constitution.147 He was joined by 
two Non-Status Indians (NSI), who claimed to have suffered the same consequences through 
being denied federal jurisdiction.148 While this paper will only address the question of whether 
the Supreme Court should find that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, the Daniels case also 
seeks to answer whether NSI are Section 91(24) Indians. The inclusion of the NSI in the Daniels 
case only reaffirms the fact that Métis identity is so poorly understood in the Daniels case, that it 
can be lumped together with the identity of NSI to say that both the Métis and NSI can be 
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described as being Indian without having status under the Indian Act. This completely denies all 
other aspects of Métis identity that may include language, culture, history, traditions, etcetera.  
Together, the Métis and Non-Status Indian plaintiffs are referred to as the Congress of 
Aboriginal Peoples (CAP), or the plaintiffs. The respondents to this case are Her Majesty the 
Queen, as represented by the Department of Northern and Aboriginal Affairs, and the Attorney 
General of Canada. They will be referred to collectively as the respondents.  
The main plaintiff of this case, Harry Daniels, was the former president of the Congress 
of Aboriginal Peoples, a representative body for Métis and Non-Status Indians.149 In his life he 
had become a prominent Métis leader and activist.150 Before bringing this case forward, Daniels 
had played an important role in ensuring that the Métis were explicitly included in Section 35 
during the creation of the Constitution Act, 1982.151 His efforts were successful because for the 
first time, the word Métis and not half breed appeared in a federal statute.  
However, Harry Daniels’ work had only just begun. The Métis who wanted to claim 
rights under Section 35 had to go to extreme lengths to ensure that their rights were upheld, 
which usually involved going through the court system.152 Métis leaders like Daniels tried to 
meet with the federal government to define these Section 35 rights and figure out a more 
reasonable way for the Métis to exercise such rights, but the government refused to even meet 
with the Métis. It argued that the Métis were not Indians under 91(24) and therefore, the Métis 
were not under the jurisdiction of the federal government.153  
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As a result, Métis have been treated as “political footballs” under this power, meaning 
they have been bounced back from the federal government to the provinces, with both levels of 
government denying their jurisdiction the Métis.154 As Justice Phellan noted, this constant denial 
coming from both levels of government has made the Métis the most “collaterally and damaged 
peoples” of Canada.155 With his work on Métis rights and recognition not over, Daniels brought 
this case forward as a means to solve the confusion over the ambiguous legal status of the Métis 
both in federal Indian policy, and under the Indian power of Section 91(24).  
Once the plaintiffs began their action, the Federal government stalled efforts to have this 
case reach trial.156 Even when the case reached court, the respondents continued to stall the 
plaintiffs’ efforts, by refusing to admit certain documents for the trial.157 Despite the federal 
government’s efforts, the Daniels case was finally heard by the Federal Court of Canada 12 years 
after the plaintiffs began the action.158 The hearing lasted 6 weeks, and the Federal Court had to 
consider over 800 pieces of evidence contained within 15,000 documents, as well as testimony of 
8 expert witnesses.159  
The question all of this evidence sought to answer was whether the Métis are considered 
to be Indian under section 91(24) of the Canadian Constitution, and therefore, whether Canada 
has the exclusive jurisdiction over the Métis. More precisely, the plaintiffs asked the court to 
grant three declarations. First, they sought a declaration that stated that the Métis were 
considered Indians under Section 91(24). The the second declaration they sought was a statement 
that Canada has a fiduciary relationship with the Métis, meaning it must act in the best interest of 
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the Métis. The third declaration they were after was a statement articulating Canada’s duty to 
consult with the Métis.160 
Justice Phellan, writing unanimously for the Federal Court, granted the first declaration 
for both the Métis and the NSI, but did not grant the second or third declaration.161 His reason 
was that it was already obvious that Canada has to act in a fiduciary manner towards the Indians 
under Section 91(24), and as such, this declaration would lack practical utility after the Métis 
were found to be Indians under 91(24).162 The Judge also stated that without a specific act or 
piece of legislation, the court cannot make a declaration in the abstract regarding the duty to 
consult.163  
Both parties appealed the federal court judge’s decision. Canada appealed on the basis 
that the first declaration in relation to both the Métis and Non-Status Indians was unfounded on 
fact and law and that it lacked practical utility, as it was made in a vacuum without a specific 
situation.164 Furthermore, the respondents suggested the Daniels problem could easily be solved 
because the federal government already has the power to include the Métis in certain programs 
and benefits for Aboriginal Peoples under its spending power.165 The CAP also appealed the 
Federal Court’s decision, but on the basis that the judge erred in failing to grant the second and 
third declarations.166  
In 2014, the Federal Court of Appeals heard the Daniels case. Justice Dawson, writing 
unanimously, accepted the Trial Judge’s findings, but modified the declaration to only apply to 
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the Métis and not to NSI.167 His reasoning for deleting the reference to NSI was that Canada 
already had clear jurisdiction over the NSI and so this declaration would be redundant.168 He also 
upheld Justice Phellan’s reasons not to grant the other two declarations.  
Not surprisingly, both parties appealed again. The CAP argued that the Court erred in 
modifying the declaration to exclude the NSI, and erred in failing to grant the second and third 
declaration.169 Canada appealed saying the court erred in giving even the first declaration only to 
the Métis.170 As anticipated, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Daniels Case, which it did on 
October 8th, 2015. The Supreme Court is currently deciding a ruling on the Daniels case, and its 
final opinion on this matter is expected to be released within six to twelve months of the hearing.   
 
Problems with the Daniels Case: Lack of Métis Perspectives 
The Supreme Court of Canada acts as the last appeal level for disputes occurring across 
Canada. It keeps the parliament and provinces’ powers in check, and can serve as a mediator 
when issues arise between a party and a government.171 While the plaintiffs may have had no 
other option but to pursue this matter in court, especially since they were denied the ability to 
even meet with the Canadian government to discuss this matter, the Canadian Courts system is 
not the ideal solution for the nature of this problem.  
Lack of Métis Perspectives on the bench 
                                                
167. Ibid., 159. 
168. Ibid., 79. 
169. Appellants’ Factum, Daniels v. Canada., [2015] SCC 35945, 4, http://www.scc-
csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35945/FM010_Appellants_Harry-Daniels-et-al.pdf.  
170. Factum of respondents on appeal and Factum of appellants on cross-appeal, Daniels v. Canada., 
[2015] SCC 35945. Accessed January 12, 2016, 2,3, http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-
DocumentsWeb/35945/FM020_Respondents_Her-Majesty-the-Queen-as-represented-by-The-Minister-
of-Indian-Affairs-and-Northern-Development-et-aL.pdf.  
171. “Role of the Court,” Supreme Court of Canada, Last modified April 16, 2016, http://www.scc-
csc.ca/court-cour/role-eng.aspx.  
 	  
51 
The first main problem with the Daniels case is that it has been heard by courts with not 
one single Aboriginal judge or Justice, whether First Nations, Métis or Inuit.172 In fact, there has 
never been an aboriginal justice to serve on Canada’s Supreme Court to this day.173 Before his 
retirement, Justice Louis Lebel, the second longest serving Justice, suggested that Canada make a 
stronger effort to appoint Aboriginal Justices.174 This suggestion however, was met with 
pushback from government officials and Canadians who say having Aboriginal Justices on the 
court would be unfair, as they would not be able to objectively answer questions pertaining to 
Aboriginal Peoples.175 However, the same can be said about the current court. Non-aboriginal 
justices may have a bias towards Aboriginal Peoples, or a misunderstanding of Aboriginal 
identity.176 This is one of the main problems with the judges involved in the Daniels case, as they 
have perpetuated incorrect understandings of Indigeneity and of the Métis.  
Aboriginal People, more than any other minority in Canada, should have representation 
on the bench of the Supreme Court because of their unique status as Canada’s First Peoples who  
have formed the bedrock of the country we have today, but have historically been left out of the 
debates during the time Canada entered confederation.177 Moreover, having Aboriginal Justices 
on the court is crucial in achieving reconciliation between Aboriginal Peoples and Canada, which 
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is what this case strives for, and what is at the center of current Aboriginal policy.178 Only 
Aboriginal People who have suffered under colonial governments are in the position to ensure 
that court decisions are aware of these injustices and are thinking of the best path to ensure 
reconciliation. Furthermore, Aboriginal People are also the most likely to be able to educate the 
court in Aboriginal perspectives and make sure that court debates do not further colonial ideas of 
Indigeneity.179 Additionally, having Aboriginal Justices on the court could help ensure the 
infiltration of some of the teachings and values of AIIS in court room discussions. Having an 
Aboriginal Justice on the Supreme Court bench would also likely improve the court’s general 
cognition, since studies have shown that diverse perspectives are important in getting people to 
consider positions they did not before, and in strengthening their own arguments.180  
Lack of Métis Perspectives in the Hearings 
Added to the lack of Aboriginal perspective coming from those interpreting the Daniels 
case is a significant lack of Métis voices present in the Daniels debate. While it may be that there 
are some lawyers or expert witnesses involved in the Daniels case who are Métis, there is no way 
of knowing as no one in the Daniels case has spoken in the first person. Instead, all parties 
involved in the Daniels case speak of the Métis as an out-group, or as the Other. This lack of 
Métis agency creates an environment where the courts are thinking about an issue that will 
directly impact one group of people, without having that group present in the debate.  
Studies have shown that simply having someone at the table during debates who can 
speak in the first person can have a significant impact on the policy makers who will decide the 
issue. For example, during the debate on same-sex marriage in the United Kingdom Parliament, 
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openly-gay members of parliament spoke in the first person, about how the the passing of same-
sex marriage legislation would directly impact them. By having people present in the debate who 
made the conversation more personal, other members of parliaments changed their opinions to 
favor the passing of same-sex legislation.181 However, the Daniels case is being debated, argued 
and decided by a majority of non-Aboriginal attorneys, expert witnesses, and Judges and Justices 
who may not be have the chance to hear from Métis individuals who will be directly impacted by 
this decision.  
Moreover, this lack of a Métis perspective in the courts furthers this concept of viewing 
the Métis as the Other. In the Daniels case, the entire conversation is phrased as “they”, and 
“them”, since the court is speaking about the Métis as a group totally different from anyone in 
the hearings. Also, the majority of the evidence considered in the Daniels case is evidence from 
the early to late 1800s, which simply furthers the court’s references to the Métis as the Other. 
Viewing the Métis as the other in the Daniels case makes it difficult for the Metis to be taken 
seriously as an Aboriginal People, as this idea of the other perpetuates the binary that is the 
Other, and the West, in which the Metis do not fit neatly. Also, as the evidence is mostly 
revolved around the past, this only reinforces the problematic idea of Indigeneity highlighted by 
Robert Williams, where people expect to see Indigenous People as savage and uncivilized. If the 
court considered evidence focusing more on the Métis of today, it would realize that the Métis 
are not so different to other Canadians, and could perhaps counter this idea of viewing 
Indigenous Peoples as the Other.  
Lack of Métis Perspectives in the Evidence 
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Some of the only Métis voices and perspectives presented in the Daniels hearing are 
contained within the evidence. However, these exhibits typically represent Métis voices from the 
past, as represented by Europeans and Canadian officials, which may not be an accurate 
representation of what the Métis actually thought of themselves around 1867.  
In issuing the first declaration, the lower courts relied on 15,000 pages of testimonies and 
speeches made by government officials, fathers of the Confederation, priests and missionaries, as 
well as legal statutes, treaties, acts of legislation, and Supreme Court rulings, all of which present 
the voice and interpretation of Canadian lawmakers, and not of the Métis. It is likely that at this 
time, the Métis had very little or no say at all in the way they were perceived by these Europeans 
and Canadians.182 
While a few pieces of the Daniels evidence seemed to instead provide an insight into 
whether the Métis viewed themselves as Indian or not, these documents still present the voice of 
the Métis through the interpretation of law-makers. Since these Métis perspectives are being 
documented by Canadian government officials, these statements could have been lost in 
translation. More concerning however, is that the Métis could have felt they too needed to make 
dishonest statements of their identity, as they were speaking to their colonial government. 
For example, the plaintiffs relied on a speech by Sir John A. MacDonald, Canada’s First 
Prime Minister, made in the House of Commons in July of 1885, who said “The half breeds did 
not allow themselves to be Indians”.183 While this seems to be a clear indication of what the 
Métis thought of themselves, this is still not a Métis perspective, but rather a representation of 
Métis’ perspective through a government official. In addition, as the expert witness Gwyneth 
Jones testified, the Métis would not have wanted to be viewed as and treated as Indian at the time 
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because during the post-confederation era, being Indian was unwanted, because “the closer you 
were to being considered white, the higher you were on the social scale.”184 Additionally, at the 
time, being Indian meant to face discrimination from the federal government.185 The Métis were 
likely aware of this and therefore, would not have chosen to be seen as Indian.  
Like the Canadian government, the Métis too were likely playing up their ability to pass 
as either Indian or white due to their distinction as a mixed people, in a way that would provide 
them the most benefits. The Métis likely realized they too could manipulate their identities when 
it would be convenient for them to do so, and add emphasis to whatever half of them they 
thought would help them survive.186 The Métis were likely aware of the treatment of their First-
nations neighbors by the Crown and would have feared receiving a similar treatment, and so they 
would have wanted to pass as white in order to avoid being seen as lower-class citizens and 
avoid being mistreated by the federal government.187 
Therefore, it is very difficult to determine what the Métis actually thought of themselves 
around 1867, as the evidence relies on what they told government officials at a time when it was 
bad to be Indian. However, today the Métis are reclaiming their Aboriginal identity, now that 
there is less stigma around being Aboriginal, or being Métis.188 It is not that the Métis have just 
recently emerged as an Aboriginal group. The Métis have always been aware of who they were 
and of their Aboriginal identity.189  
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These three areas showing the lack of Métis agency throughout the Daniels case 
demonstrate that the court system is not the perfect remedy for this problem, though the plaintiffs 
likely had no other option. However, many of these problems are due to the way the lower courts 
framed and addressed the Daniels question, through an originalist approach which requires 
asking whether the framers would have meant to include the Métis under Section 91(24).190 
Unfortunately, there is no documentation of any discussion surrounding what the framers 
intended for the word Indian to mean in 91(24). As such, without this direct evidence, the courts 
had to search through hundreds of pages of evidence to try and gain some insight into whether 
the Métis were treated as Indians by their colonial governments around the time the Indian power 
was created.191 Thus, the nature of the question and the evidence does not require emphasis on 
Métis’ perspectives, but rather on government officials’ perspectives around 1867. The next 
chapter will demonstrate how the Supreme Court can restore a sense of agency to the Métis in a 
case that is about them, by simply changing its approach to the Daniels question.  
 
Problems with Lower Court’s Approach: The Originalist Interpretation 
While the lower courts were correct in finding that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, 
they came to their conclusions improperly, through approaching the Daniels question from an 
originalist interpretation, instead of relying on the more appropriate living tree approach. 
Originalist Interpretation versus Living Tree Approach 
All courts involved in the Daniels case have considered two distinct ways of interpreting 
the question of whether the Métis constitute Section 91(24) Indians; the originalist interpretation, 
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or the living tree approach.192 An originalist interpretation is where the Constitution is interpreted 
to maintain the original text, the original intentions, original understandings, and original values 
of the provision.193 By applying this kind of approach to interpreting Section 91(24), the courts 
asked themselves whether the framers of the Constitution would have meant to include the Métis 
under Section 91(24).  
The second method of constitutional interpretation which the courts considered was the 
living tree approach, which allows for a broader and more flexible interpretation of the 
Constitution. It views the Constitution as a living tree, meaning it should accommodate and 
address the realities of modern life.194 A progressive interpretation of the constitution 
acknowledges that society can change, and the Framers of the Constitution could not have 
anticipated what changes would come in the future.195 For example, the Supreme Court relied on 
a living tree approach in its Same-Sex Marriage ruling. While an originalist interpretation would 
have required for the Supreme Court to rule that marriage is the union between a man and a 
woman, as it was written in the Constitution, the Supreme Court found it was clear that society 
had changed from the time the constitution was drafted, and the constitution should be allowed to 
change accordingly.196  
The main difference between these two methods of constitutional interpretation is their 
emphasis on the past or the present. The originalist interpretation places emphasis on the past 
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through attempting to uncover what the framers would have meant while writing the Constitution 
in 1867. On the contrary, the living tree approach places more emphasis on the present, through 
considering modern day society, and through considering how the constitution can adapt to new 
realities. Moreover, the originalist approach asks for a more conservative and rigid interpretation 
of the words of the Constitution, while the living tree approach allows for a more liberal and 
flexible interpretation of the words of the Constitution.  
The main difference between these two approaches as they are applied to the Daniels case 
is that they change the nature of the Daniels question. The originalist approach must ask whether 
it was true that the Métis would have been considered Indians in 1867, whereas the living tree 
approach asks whether the Métis should be viewed as Indian under Section 91(24) today. 
 
The Problems with an Originalist Approach 
The lower courts involved in the Daniels case decided to engage in an originalist 
interpretation which required that they try and uncover what it is that the framers would have 
meant by Indian when they created the Indian Power. Thus, the majority of the evidence 
considered by the lower court judges dealt with the period immediately before or after 
confederation.197 The federal court judge split  the evidence into six categories, but mostly 
focusing his opinion on the pre-confederation, confederation and post-confederation era.198 By 
analyzing this evidence, he found that it was more likely that the framers would have wanted to 
include the Métis in the definition of Indian. The federal court of appeals judge also relied on an 
originalist interpretation, and upheld the federal court judges’ findings that, prior to and 
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immediately after the creation of the Constitution, the Métis were largely considered to be 
Indian.199   
Based on an originalist approach, it is likely that the framers would have intended to 
include the Métis within the definition of Indians under Section 91(24), since the Métis were 
seen and treated as Indians by the Canadian government in many instances. However, there are 
three main problems with the originalist approach used by the lower courts that help explain 
why, while the lower courts came to the correct conclusion in finding that the Métis are Section 
91(24) Indians, their method was highly problematic. First, this approach makes the Daniels 
evidence seem very ambiguous. Secondly, it relies on viewing 91(24) as a racial classification, 
and finally, it relies on the inclusion of the Métis within 91(24) wherever it was convenient to 
Canada.  
 
Ambiguous Evidence 
In choosing to approach the Daniels question from an originalist interpretation, the 
parties involved in the Daniels case had to consider whether the framers would have intended for 
the Métis to be included in the definition of Indian in 1867. As such, this required for the parties 
in the Daniels case to place themselves in the shoes of the framers and think the way they 
thought in 1867. This meant understanding Section 91(24) as a racial classification, and 
understanding the Métis as mixed. Thus, by interpreting the evidence in the Daniels case with 
such understandings, the majority of the evidence becomes very ambiguous.   
While over 800 exhibits were considered to help answer the Daniels question, it only 
takes the analysis of a few pieces of evidence from an originalist interpretation, to realize the 
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evidence in the Daniels case seems very ambiguous and inconsistent. For almost every piece of 
evidence that could be interpreted in a way that supports the idea of the Métis as Indians, another 
piece of evidence could be interpreted to support the Métis as being excluded from the category 
of Indian. Examples of evidence showing the Métis being treated as Indians include the Gradual 
Civilization Of Indians Act of 1857, the Robinson Huron Treaties, and the broadening of the 
Indian Act for its liquor policy in 1894, to name a few 200. Examples of the Métis being treated as 
whites, or as being specifically excluded from the word Indian include a speech from Canada’s 
first Prime Minister, Sir John A. MacDonald, where he argued that the Métis were not Indians, or 
censuses where the Métis were specifically not included as Indians.201  This treatment of the 
Métis as either Indian or white under the Indian Power is not surprising because, as chapter 2 
demonstrated, the Métis have always been treated inconsistently as Indian, depending on what 
helped fulfil Canada’s goals at the time.  
However, by implementing an originalist interpretation of the Daniels case, the evidence 
too becomes highly contradictory, just as Métis’ treatment was very contradictory. Through 
engaging in an originalist interpretation, the courts place weight on evidence that shows the 
Métis being treated as white or as Indian during times when the Métis could be treated as either 
Indian or white, depending on what was more convenient for the federal government. This means 
that the courts are then basing their decisions on evidence that is not an accurate or genuine view 
of the Métis. For example, the federal court judge relied heavily on the creation of the Manitoba 
Act, to show how Canada was exercising its power under s. 91(24) over Indians when it dealt 
with the Métis throughout the enactment of the Manitoba Act.202 Although, as Chapter 2 
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demonstrated, this treatment of the Métis as Indian was never a genuine treatment, but rather a 
strategic move by Canada. As such, it seems problematic to base a court case on evidence that 
reveals the artificial treatment of the Métis as s.91(24) Indians.   
Because the lower courts relied on an originalist interpretation, there were even 
contradictions contained within the evidence itself. This is because, by perpetuating the framers’ 
understanding of Section 91(24) as a racial classification, and by perpetuating the framers’ 
understanding of the Métis as mixed, certain documents can easily be interpreted by both parties 
to justify their respective and opposite positions. For example, in the 1850s, the British 
Parliament had commissioned a committee to conduct a census of the Indian population in 
Canada at the time. Here half breeds were not enumerated with the list of other Indians, but were 
listed in a separate category along with whites.203 The respondents used this document to argue 
that this was a clear indication that, only about a decade before the creation of 91(24), the Métis 
were clearly not considered to be Indian.204 The CAP however, looked at this same piece of 
evidence and argued that still, the Métis were not included as whites but were listed as half 
breeds, showing that they would not have been considered white.  
Just this one piece of evidence shows the problem with engaging in an originalist 
interpretation, as the parties involved in the Daniels case implement the same kind of thinking as 
the framers. The interpretation of this one piece of evidence shows how both parties are thinking 
of the Métis as mixed, by either highlighting how the Métis can be considered to be Indian, or 
how they can be considered to be white, when according to their view of the Metis as mixed, 
they were neither. This example demonstrates how, under an originalist interpretation, the 
evidence itself can be supporting both sides of the debate, depending on what part of the Métis is 
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highlighted; their Indian part, or their white part. Additionally, since the originalist interpretation 
requires to be engaging in the kind of thinking of 1867, the parties interpreting this piece of 
evidence are also demonstrating a strong desire to be able to place the Métis neatly into one 
category, of either Indian or white. However, the truth is that the Métis did not fit neatly in such 
categories.  
These examples demonstrate why an originalist interpretation of the Daniels case relies 
on evidence that can be ambiguous and inconsistent. This inconsistent evidence should not serve 
as the foundation for a modern day court decision that will have serious consequences on the 
Métis and on the federal government.  
 
Racial Classification 
Section 91(24) has already been interpreted by the Supreme Court as creating a racial 
classification of Indians. Justice Beetz in his opinion in the Canard case, relied on an originalist 
interpretation when he found that Section 91(24) created a racial classification among Canadians. 
He wrote, “The British North America Act, 1867, […] was enacted, by using the word ‘Indians’ 
in s. 91(24), creates a racial classification and refers to a racial group for whom it contemplates 
the possibility of a special treatment.”205  
Also relying on an originalist interpretation, both judges in the lower courts noted that 
section 91(24) was created and intended to serve as a racial classification, separating some of 
Canada’s citizens from others on the basis of their race.206 They also recognized that today, this 
definition is unacceptable. The federal court judge even went so far to call this racial 
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classification “repulsive”.207 Despite this understanding however, Justice Phellan continued to 
base his ruling on such a definition of Section 91(24) when he said, “it’s important to understand 
the context at the time and the perspective at the time to understand the power [being Section 
91(24)]”.208 As a result of applying an originalist interpretation, the Daniels case focused on race 
in order to support its conclusion that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians. 
Justice Phellan mostly relied on evidence with racial references, to prove that the Métis 
are Section 91(24) Indians. For example, he included in his reasons, a speech by Cartier, a 
representative in the Rupert’s Land negotiations occurring around 1870. In this speech, Cartier 
said that the Métis should be included in these negotiations because, “any inhabitant having any 
Indian blood in his veins is Indian.”209 Additionally, the federal court judge relied on one of the 
expert witnesses’ mention of how those of mixed blood were often distinguishable by their 
looks, and that even though they did not want to be considered Indian, they were viewed as such 
by other whites.210  
Justice Phellan made another deliberate reference to race by focusing on the Liquor 
Policy of the Indian Act. He stated that the Métis’ inclusion within and liquor policy was made 
possible because members of the Northwest Mounted Police had a hard time distinguishing the 
Métis from other Indians.211 His analysis here is a deliberate extension of the framers’ racial 
understanding of Indigenous Peoples, by taking about how some Métis were not distinguishable 
from Indians by their looks, and therefore, should be considered Indian under Section 91(24) of 
the Constitution.  
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This quest for references to race however, was not restricted to talk of blood and physical 
appearance. For example, Justice Phellan also emphasized the inclusion of the Métis within the 
gradual civilization act, stating that this inclusion of the Métis as Indian was possible because 
these Métis were seen as needing civilizations, as they were likely not considered to be fully 
civilized men just yet.212 Justice Phellan also emphasized the Métis’ racial resemblance to 
Indians beyond appearance when he highlighted the Metis’ inclusion under the Robinson 
Treaties. Here Justice Phellan, noted that the Métis were included in these treaties since many of 
them were living on reservations with Indians.213 These examples demonstrate how the lower 
courts came to repeat the racial understanding of the Indian power and of the Métis in order to 
find the Métis to be Section 91(24) Indians, through highlighting instances where the Metis were 
not found to be Indian because of their own “Indianess”, or rather “Metisness”, but because they 
demonstrated racial similarities to Indians, both physically and culturally.  
As a result of perpetuating the framers’ understanding of 91(24) and of the Métis, the 
lower court judges were able to come to their conclusions by highlighting instances where the 
Métis appeared to be more racially Indian than white, or where their Indian side was more 
obvious than their white side. Consequently, not only is the lower court’s declaration based on 
something subjective, but their declarations also reinforce the idea that the Métis are less 
indigenous than other Aboriginal People in Canada, because the Métis’ inclusion within 91(24) 
then is only achievable by highlighting the part of them that is Indian. As a result, the Métis are 
inevitably seen as less Indian than other Aboriginal People, because it is only part of their 
identity that is considered to be Indian. This racial classification of the Métis becomes even more 
dangerous for the Métis of today, who continue to feel that their identity as an Indigenous person 
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is challenged because the racial classification of the Métis as mixed has become engrained in 
Canadian minds.  
Another problem with basing a declaration on viewing 91(24) as a racial classification, is 
that the lower courts’ declaration can be achieved by considering other Indians who had mixed 
ancestry, but who never identified as Métis. For example, in coming to his conclusion, the 
federal court judge relied on evidence that showed certain Indians of mixed ancestry engaging in 
treaty negotiations, such as Chief Kerr of the Six Nations, who was described as a “quarter 
blood.”214 However, just because Chief Kerr had mixed ancestry does not mean he would have 
identified as Métis. He obviously identified with his own nation, the six nations, since he served 
as this First-Nation’s chief. By placing weight on this piece of evidence, the courts reduce Métis 
identity to nothing more than having mixed ancestry.  
One last problem with basing a declaration on viewing 91(24) as a racial classification is 
that it is inconsistent with the Métis People to whom the declaration would apply to today. 
Today’s Métis would have a very hard time fitting into this racial classification, as their Indian 
ancestry may date back much further than it would have in 1867.215 In other words, if 91(24) was 
created today as a racial classification, most Métis would not fit within this head of power 
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because today, most Métis do not physically resemble an Indian phenotype, and may also not 
carry out the certain lifestyle associated with the Indian race.  
In summary, with an originalist interpretation of Section 91(24), the lower courts 
perpetuated the framers’ racial understanding of the Indian power, as well as their racial 
understanding of the Métis. The lower courts were able to grant the plaintiffs’ declaration by 
highlighting those Métis who racially resembled Indians, either physically or by their lifestyles. 
Because this method views the Métis as mixed, it also perpetuates the understanding that the 
Métis are less Indigenous than other Indigenous Peoples such as Status-Indians.  
Canada’s Own Goals and Motivations  
Race was an important determinant of Métis’ inclusion within 91(24), but another factor 
determining whether the Métis would be considered Indian was Canada’s own goals and 
motivations.216 Since section 91(24) was created as a racial classification, and since the Métis 
were primarily seen as a mixed people, both their inclusion or exclusion in 91(24) could easily 
be justified by Canadian lawmakers. It was Canada’s own motivations however, that drove 
Métis’ inclusion or exclusion into 91(24). And so, in applying an originalist interpretation of the 
Daniels case, the lower courts based their declaration on evidence that was not the result of a 
sincere observation of the Métis as Indian, but rather was the result of Canada’s own goals and 
motivations at the time near confederation.  
For example, the Métis of the Red River Settlement were viewed as having Indian title, 
which the lower courts used as evidence to show that the Métis were largely considered to be 
Indian around the time of Confederation.217 However, the court stopped analyzing this piece of 
evidence once it found the Métis to have Indian Title, but further analysis of the situation shows 
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that this view of the Métis was not a genuine statement made by Canada. Rather, it was made 
because it was what was best for Canada in fulfilling its goals of that period. The court did not 
feel the need to look further into this piece of evidence to see if it was a genuine treatment of the 
Métis as Indians, when it explicitly stated that it did not want to look further and see if the Métis 
had a genuine claim to having Indian title.218 
At times, the court even understood that Canada’s treatment of the Métis as Indian was 
not based on a sincere evaluation of the indigeneity, but on Canada’s own goals and motivations. 
For example, Justice Phellan analyzed the Robinson Treaties and found that Métis’ inclusion 
under the treaties were to protect Canada from a Métis uprising, however he continued to use this 
as a piece of evidence to prove that near the time of confederation, the Métis were mostly treated 
as Indian. Justice Phellan explained how, prior to signing the Robinson treaties, a small Métis 
community had lead a rebellion against the installment of a mine near their community.219 The 
framers had likely been aware of this event and would have wanted the power over the Métis in 
order to prevent any further rebellions and continue exploiting natural resources.220 And so, 
while the lower court judges used this instance as supporting the fact that the Métis would have 
been viewed as Indian around the time of confederation, this treatment as Indian was only based 
on what would benefit Canada.  
The lower courts relied on those instances where the Métis were treated as Indian when 
necessary to come to their conclusion, despite the fact that this treatment did not mean the Métis 
were necessarily Indian.221 Furthermore, by providing a declaration that is based on these kinds 
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of examples, the lower courts’ declaration perpetuates the understanding of the Métis as mixed 
because, while it was Canada’s motivations that determined how it treated the Métis, its view of 
the Métis as mixed was what justified either treatment.  
In conclusion, these problems together show how, while the lower courts achieved the 
right conclusion in finding that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, their method was severely 
flawed. The lower courts’ method of relying on an originalist approach meant that the evidence 
considered in the Daniels case was highly ambiguous and contradictory. Moreover, the 
originalist approach specifically chooses to understand 91(24) as a racial classification, and as 
such, the lower courts perpetuated the framers’ racial understanding of the 91(24) and of the 
Métis. Lastly, the lower court opinions relied on evidence that demonstrated instances where the 
Métis were treated as Indian wherever it was beneficial to the Canadian government, and not 
because the Metis were truly understood to be Indian.  
The lower courts could have denied the use of race in a modern court case, but through 
choosing to interpret the Daniels question from an originalist approach, race came to dominate 
the Daniels debate. Only a living tree approach will allow for the Supreme Court to move away 
from viewing Section 91(24) as a racial classification, and allow for a genuine evaluation of the 
Métis as Indians, without having to consider race.  
 
Chapter 4 
The Proper Approach to the Daniels Question   
 
As chapter 3 demonstrated, the lower courts erred in relying on an originalist 
interpretation of the Daniels question. While the lower courts found that framers would have 
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intended to include the Métis within the definition of Indian in section 91(24), their method was 
flawed. By relying on an originalist interpretation of the Daniels question, their declaration was 
based on ambiguous evidence, on viewing 91(24) as a racial classification and was also based on 
instances where the Métis were treated as Indian only because it helped fulfil Canada’s own 
goals at the time. The use of an originalist interpretation also created a discussion that revolved 
in the past when this decision will have significant impacts on the Métis of today, most of whom 
would not relate to this racial definition of Métis. 
This chapter will first explain why a living tree approach is needed in the Daniels case 
and how it should be applied to the Daniels question, in order to find that the Métis are Section 
91(24) Indians. This chapter will also demonstrate why it is necessary for the Supreme Court to 
also grant all of the plaintiffs’ three declarations in order to resolve the problem which this case 
seeks to address. Lastly, this chapter will consider the implications of the different declarations 
the Supreme Court may grant.  
 
Why the Living Tree Approach is Needed in the Daniels Case 
As chapter 1 explained, a living tree approach is needed when, 1) there has been a 
significant change in society to allow for a deviation from the original intent of the constitutional 
provision, 2) when the intention of the framers of the Constitution has been addressed and there 
is danger in interpreting the provision with reference to such original intentions, and 3) if the 
norms of international law are inconsistent with a traditional originalist interpretation of the 
provision called into question.  
The Daniels question, namely whether the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, fulfils all 
these three criteria that call for a living tree interpretation of the question. This next section will 
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show how, 1) it is clear that Canadian society has progressed significantly from 1867 regarding 
the status of Aboriginal People, and more specifically, regarding the status of Métis People, 2) 
the intention of the framers today would be seen inappropriate and inconsistent with modern-day 
realities, and 3) the originalist interpretation relied on by the lower courts is inconsistent with the 
norms of International Indigenous Rights Law. In addition to these reasons requiring a living tree 
approach, there are clear indications that when the framers created the Indian power, they would 
have intended that it be interpreted broadly.  
Reason #1: Society has progressed since 1867 
First, a living tree approach should be relied on when there are clear indications that 
society has progressed since the time the Constitution was written regarding the particular 
provision in question. It is clear that society has progressed from the time the Constitution was 
written regarding the way the view and treatment of Aboriginal People by Canadian officials and 
in Canadian law.  
As the Trial Judge found, the constitution was first written during a time when the 
definition of Indigeneity was first and foremost about seeing Indians as backwards and as 
uncivilized peoples.222 However, times have changed, and Canadian society has moved away 
from a racialized view of Indigenous Peoples as backwards and uncivilized, towards an era of 
reconciliation, respect, and cooperation.223 Instead of viewing Indigenous Peoples as backwards 
and uncivilized or in need of assimilation, Canadian society has finally begun to honor and 
respect Indigenous Peoples, their customs, culture, traditions and languages. Especially with the 
election of Canada’s 23rd Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, a more positive attention has been 
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placed on Aboriginal Peoples. For example, Trudeau has increased the visibility of Indigenous 
Peoples in government through appointing the very first Aboriginal Attorney General.224 This is 
a significant contrast from the time when the Indian Act did not allow lawyers or doctors to be 
viewed as Indian, because Indians were considered to be backwards, uncivilized and uneducated. 
Trudeau has also promoted the respect and visibility of Indigenous Peoples and their cultures 
during important parliamentary events, such as during his swearing-in ceremony, which featured 
Inuit throat singers and dancers.225 This is a significant contrast to when Indigenous Peoples’ 
cultures and lifestyles were viewed as uncivilized or backwards.   
Society has especially progressed in its view of the Métis. Around the time of 
Confederation until not very long ago, being half breed was considered to be part of the lowest 
class of Canadians.226 Half breeds were not accepted as whites, but also were not accepted as 
Indians, and as a result, half breeds did not receive the treatment as “civilized men”, nor were 
they afforded even the smallest benefits that came with being viewed as Indian. Even to this day, 
Metis People face discrimination for being Aboriginal, but they also face discrimination for not 
being Indian, and therefore, they are “doubly discriminated.”227  
However, today, there has been an increase in the number of individuals self-identifying 
as Métis. Statistics Canada found that the surge in the number of Métis is due to more Métis 
individuals now acknowledging their identities as Métis as there is less obvious forms of 
discrimination towards the Métis.228  The Trial Judge also found that this surge in the number of 
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Métis People in Canada is likely because the Canadian government has shifted its position from 
having policies aimed to assimilate and control Aboriginal People, to one of policies promoting 
reconciliation and respect.229 
Additionally, as the court found, the goals of Federal Indian Policy around 1867 were to 
control Aboriginal People to allow for the expansion out west, to civilize and assimilate 
Aboriginal People, and to get rid of any claim they might have to Indian Title.230 However, the 
goals of Aboriginal policy are no longer about assimilating and civilizing Aboriginal Peoples, 
and Canada has already “settled” the West through extinguishing Indian Title. Instead, the 
Canadian government is now in an era of correcting the years of trauma that occurred from such 
policies, by providing programs, services, and instituting affirmative action programs. For 
example, in 2007 the Canadian Parliament passed the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement, under which it commissioned the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in order to 
bring light to all the injustices Canadian Aboriginal Peoples suffered under the residential school 
period.231 Recently, Prime Minister Trudeau received the final report of the commission, and 
plans to implement all of the report’s recommendations.232  This demonstrates how Canada is no 
longer about these past policy goals, and is currently trying to correct its history of poor 
treatment of Aboriginal Peoples.  
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Additionally, many Canadians are now making statements of recognition of traditional 
lands at formal events. During Trudeau’s swearing in ceremony, the governor general of Canada 
acknowledged that the ceremony was taking place on traditional Algonquin lands.233 This is a 
significant contrast to the goals of Confederation around 1867, which were to get rid of Indian 
title in order to settle the land. Now, government officials are acknowledging that these actions 
were wrong, and is even highlighting the fact that Canada operates on Indigenous Peoples’ 
seized lands.  
The stark contrast and change in the way Canadian society viewed Aboriginal Peoples 
from 1867 to today, as well as the obvious contrast in Aboriginal policy from 1867 to today, are 
clear indicators that a living tree approach is necessary when evaluating a provision that is about 
determining who are Canada’s Aboriginal People and what are Canada’s responsibilities towards 
them.  
Reasons #2: The Original Intent of the Framers can be Rejected 
The second reason that warrants a living tree approach is when the original intent of the 
framers can be rejected, since there can be dangers in interpreting a constitutional provision from 
those intentions in the modern-day. In the Persons and the Same-sex cases, the Supreme Court 
found the framers’ original intentions, namely that persons only meant men, or that marriage was 
only meant to be the union between a man and a woman, to be inconsistent with modern-day 
morals. Similarly, the Daniels case should find that the framers original intentions, of viewing 
Section 91(24) as a racial classification and of viewing the Métis as mixed, are not appropriate in 
today’s society.  
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 The federal court judge even stated it himself that having any racial classification in 
today’s society is problematic, and cited the Holocaust and the Apartheid in South Africa to 
show the effects these kind of classifications have had in other countries.234 However, as part of 
his originalist interpretation, he went on to say that it was necessary to understand this 
perspective in order to understand how this constitutional power was exercised and then 
perpetuated this understanding of 91(24).235 Furthermore, the federal court judge even stated that 
it was possible to reject the original intentions of the framers to view Indian identity as a racial 
identity, as the Supreme Court did in Blais.236 However, he continued to rely on an originalist 
interpretation, which required that he apply many of the intentions of the framers to try and 
determine whether the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians.237 An example is where he considered 
the framers’ intention to use Section 91(24) in order to facilitate the construction of the trans-
national railroad. Therefore under these intentions, the Métis would have needed to be controlled 
as they posed a threat to the building of the railroad.238 This paternalistic intention with Section 
91(24), to control Aboriginal People, would be deemed to be wrong today. On the contrary, 
today Section 91(24) is used to allow Canada to provide services and programs for Aboriginal 
People, as well as to create mechanisms to set aside land and resources for the use of First-
Nations and the Inuit.239  
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Another example where the federal court judge relied on the framers intentions in finding 
that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians is through thinking of Section 91(24)’s assimilationist 
goals. The judge relied on many instances where the federal government would have wanted the 
power over the Métis to try to assimilate the Métis, as they were not yet considered to be fully 
white.240 This assimilationist intention behind Section 91(24) can be viewed as being 
inappropriate today, since Canada no longer seeks to assimilate Aboriginal Peoples, but seeks to 
correct this dark period in Aboriginal Policy. Through realizing that the original intentions of the 
framers with 91(24) would today be considered inappropriate, the need for a living tree 
interpretation becomes more crucial. 
 
Reason #3: The Norms of International Law 
Lastly, a living tree approach should be relied on if it allows for a ruling to be in line with 
the norms of international law, or if the originalist interpretation is inconsistent with the norms of 
international law.  
Likely the most important body of international law on Indigenous Peoples is the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).241 The UNDRIP was 
adopted by the UN general assembly in 2007, and lists a body of both individual human rights 
and collective rights for Indigenous Peoples around the world. While Canada was not one of the 
UNDRIP’s original signatories, it announced its official support for the declaration in 2010, 
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though this appears to have been more of a symbolic gesture than to have lead to any real 
changes.242  
An originalist interpretation of Section 91(24) would require that the Supreme court 
determine the Daniels case by asking whether the framers would have intended for the Métis to 
be included under Section 91(24). This requires courts to engage in the kind of thinking done by 
the framers in 1867, which includes viewing indigenous identity as a racial identity. The 
UNDRIP makes it clear that Indigenous identity is a political identity and not one based on 
race.243 Additionally, the UNDRIP allows Indigenous Peoples to define their own identities.244 
Therefore, an originalist interpretation of the Daniels question would be inconsistent with the 
current norms of International law as it would rely on a racial understanding of Indigeneity and 
of the Métis, and would also rely on governmental officials’ views of the Métis around 1867, and 
not on the Métis’ own self-identification. 
By engaging in an originalist interpretation, the courts are also required to apply the 
intentions of the framers. Part of the framers intentions with 91(24) in 1867 were to assimilate 
and civilize Indians.245 And so, by applying the originalist interpretation, the courts are required 
to wonder whether the Métis were in need of civilization and assimilation. The UNDRIP has 
recognized that this era in Indigenous histories was extremely harmful to Indigenous Peoples, 
and so it prohibits any governmental efforts to civilize and assimilate Indigenous Peoples.246 
Therefore, while the Supreme Court would not be deliberately trying to assimilate the Métis, it 
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would still be basing a decision through the eyes of the framers who intended to assimilate the 
Métis, which is inconsistent with the norms of international indigenous law today.  
To add to these three reasons listed above, there are clear indications that the framers 
would have intended for the constitution to be interpreted broadly. The framers were aware that 
they could not anticipate what would come in the future, and thus, they would have intended for 
a broader interpretation of their words, to allow them to address a wide range of situations 
coming from a wide variety of people.247 Considering the flip-flop treatment of the Métis even 
leading up to the creation of 1867, it would have made sense for the framers to never define what 
they meant by Indian. Without a clear definition of Indian, the framers would have allowed for 
the definition of Indian to not remain stuck in time, but to be fluid in order to address future 
policy concerns. The means that they could have continued the legacy of colonial governments 
in treating the Métis as Indian where it was convenient, and denying them that status where it 
would burden Canada. While the framers’ motives against a narrow interpretation of 91(24) were 
probably to allow them to further accomplish Canada’s own future policy goals, the importance 
is that the framers themselves would have intended for a broader interpretation of the 
constitution and of this specific power, which is more in line with a living tree approach than an 
originalist one.248   
 
Applying the Living Tree Approach to the Daniels Case 
This next section will highlight how the Supreme Court can apply the living tree 
approach to the Daniels question. As chapter 1 explained, the application of a living tree 
approach requires, 1) a broad interpretation of the language that is being called into question, 2) 
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that the interpretation of the constitutional provision still be in line with the overall purpose of 
the provision, and 3) that the general perceptions of society on the matter be taken into 
consideration. The following discussion on language, self-identification, and of the current goals 
of Aboriginal Policy show how, by applying the steps required in a living tree interpretation of a 
constitutional provision, the Supreme Court will find that the Métis fall under the term Indian in 
Section 91(24), in a way that rejects the role of race, respects the lessons from American Indian 
and Indigenous Studies, and also puts forth a more accurate understanding of the Métis.   
Step 1: Broad Interpretation of the Word “Indian”  
A living tree approach first requires a broad interpretation of the language. This means 
that the language of the provision should be given a progressive interpretation in the present day, 
so that it can adapt to new realities.249 This, however, does not mean to simply change the 
linguistic meaning of the provision, but rather to change the meaning drawn from the text. The 
progressive interpretation of the word Indian, the central word called into question in the Daniels 
case, requires that it be interpreted as we now know Aboriginal, so that it is consistent with the 
reality that the word Indian is now outdated and has been replaced with Aboriginal. 
In 1867, the word Aboriginal did not yet exist as it does today to describe the diversity of 
Canada’s Indigenous People, namely the Métis, First-Nations, and the Inuit. Therefore, the word 
that would have been the most similar would likely have been the term Indian. This term had 
been previously used in other acts and statutes concerning Indigenous Peoples such as in the 
Royal Proclamation of 1783, and in all of the statutes that would later make up the Indian Act, 
some of which, like earlier statutes of the Act, had included Metis People. It is likely that no 
other word in the framer’s vocabulary at the time would have been considered to be broad 
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enough to refer to all of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples within a legal document. Therefore, the 
word Indian would have been the word the framers would have defaulted to when writing 
Section 91(24), to refer to a wide range of Indigenous Peoples. This is what the federal court 
judge found, and what the Supreme Court has already found in Re. the Term ‘Indian’.250  
This becomes confusing however, when the term Indian was also used to refer to status 
Indians or First-nations People, whereas half breeds would have been the term used in 1867 to 
refer to the Métis.251 The defendants relied on this to argue that Section 91(24) explicitly states 
Indians and not half breeds, but as the trial judge found, the term Indian would have seen as 
broad enough to also cover half breeds.252 Evidence submitted in the Eskimo Reference, a case 
which asked the same question as the Daniels case, but in relation to the Inuit, supports this 
logic. The Supreme court here found that Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Hector Langevin 
“always understood that the English word ‘Indians’ was to be construed and translated as 
‘sauvages’ which admittedly did include all the aborigines living within the territories in North 
America under British authority”.253 Additionally, the view of Indian based on race made it so 
that all Indigenous Peoples of any Indian blood-quantum could be referred to as Indian. This 
meant that the Métis, who were seen as having Indian blood, could be considered Indian. This 
can be seen through much of the evidence in the Daniels case, where half breeds were included 
in statutes where the federal government was relying on its power in s. 91(24), and therefore, 
included the Métis as Indians.254  
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The Attorney General of Saskatchewan stated that, because the framers would have 
wanted a broad power to deal with people of varying degrees of Indian blood, this is evidence to 
prove that they would have wanted to word Indian to be interpreted as Aboriginal as we now use 
it today.255  However, this views the word Aboriginal as anyone who has some degree of Indian 
blood, which is not an appropriate determinant of Indigenous identity as it only focuses on the 
racial aspect of Indigenous identity. Moreover, if this was the case, then many more Canadians 
who do not identify as Aboriginal would come to fit under such a definition. 
While the framers would have probably intended for the Métis to be included in the word 
Indian because the Métis had some Indian blood as the lower courts found, this distinction is not 
necessary to make in a living tree approach. A living tree approach does not require that the 
language be interpreted from the way the framers intended it to, but that it be interpreted broadly 
in order to accommodate to today’s realities. Conveniently, Canada has already coined a more 
appropriate term that can be read as a broad interpretation of the word Indian. Present-day 
Canadian society has widely adopted the use of the term Aboriginal to define all of Canada’s 
Indigenous People, namely First Nations People, the Inuit, and the Métis. This is the appropriate 
term used by governmental agencies such as Statistics Canada, who conduct statistical surveys 
on Aboriginal People which they define according to the Constitution Act 1982’s definition of 
Aboriginal, under which the Métis are included.256 Even the Department of Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs, one of the respondents in this case, uses the term Aboriginal when describing 
Canada’s Indigenous population, within which they also include the Métis.257  
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Since Canada has already come up with its own broad interpretation of the word Indian, 
the only broad interpretation of the word Indian that is in line with modern day realities would be 
to interpret Indian as Aboriginal, within which the Métis are included. In theory, the word 
Aboriginal does not include any notion of blood or race in defining Indigenous Peoples. In 
theory, it views all three main indigenous groups, the Inuit, the Métis, and First-Nations all 
equally Aboriginal. Here, no one is more Indigenous than anyone else, and thus the Métis are, in 
theory, viewed as equal to their First-Nations neighbors under this umbrella term. However, as 
Chapter 2 revealed, Métis’ treatment as Aboriginal under Section 35 has not been fully respected 
as it was for First-Nations, and much work still needs to be done to implement what this term 
suggests. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court should rely on the word Aboriginal to engage in its 
broad interpretation of the language in Section 91(24), and to realize that the Métis are included 
as Aboriginal as an affirmation of the Metis’ unique position as one of Canada’s three main 
indigenous groups.  
Not only has the term Aboriginal been adopted by Canadian society as a word which 
describes all of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples, but Canadian law has also made the switch from 
the term Indian to Aboriginal. The Constitution Act, 1982’s only two sections dealing with 
Indigenous Peoples, Section 25 and 35, do not include the word Indian but rather Aboriginal, 
defined as “First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples”.258 Therefore, any broad interpretation of the 
word Indian should be consistent with the modern language of federal Indian Policy, as part of 
the living tree’s commitment to being in line with modern day realities.  
The federal court of appeals judge stated himself that the Métis’ inclusion within Section 
35 of the Constitution Act 1982 confirms that the Métis were included as Indian at the time of 
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confederation and the Supreme Court should uphold his finding. 259 The federal court judge 
however, noted that it is important not to rely on Section 35 in determining a Section 91(24) 
case. However, since a living tree approach requires a broad interpretation that is in line with 
modern realities, it should accommodate the reality that the term Indian in federal Indian policy 
has been replaced by Aboriginal.  
Another indication that the word Indian should be read synonymously as Aboriginal is 
the Supreme Court’s Eskimo Reference ruling. Similar to the Daniels case, the Eskimo Reference 
case was brought forward to clarify confusion over whether Eskimos, known today as the Inuit, 
were under the federal government’s jurisdiction as Section 91(24) Indians. While the court 
came to this conclusion through an originalist interpretation of the constitutional provision, the 
Supreme Court still found that the framers would have intended for the Inuit to be included under 
Section 91(24) of the Constitution. 260 Therefore, it is more likely that the framers would have 
meant for the word Indian to be interpreted more broadly than to only include status Indians, as 
the Inuit also do not have status under the Indian Act.261 The Federal Court of Appeals judge 
further stated that it would be wrong to determine who is Indian under 91(24) based on who is 
Indian under the Indian Act, due to the Act’s complex reasons for excluding people from Indian 
status, which include the marrying-out rule and the educational rule.262 This ruling demonstrates 
how the Supreme Court has already acknowledged that it is more likely that the framers would 
have intended for the word Indian to be read more as we now know Aboriginal, rather than First-
Nations.  
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Again however, in a living tree approach there is no need to rely on the originalist intent 
of the framers. Nonetheless, the Eskimo Reference demonstrates that through legal 
interpretation, the word Indian in 91(24) must now be read to include First-nations and the Inuit. 
This means that it almost reflects the meaning of the word Aboriginal. All that is missing for it to 
be interpreted synonymously with the word Aboriginal, is for the Métis to also be included as 
91(24) Indians. 263 
In summary, there is evidence that the framers would have intended for the word Indian 
to be broad and therefore, to be read as we now understand the word Aboriginal. However, a 
living tree approach needs to place minimal weight on the intention of the framers. Instead, a 
living tree approach requires a progressive interpretation of the language in the provision while 
placing more emphasis on the present day. In order to accommodate the new realities of current 
Canadian society and Canadian law which have come to adopt the use of the term Aboriginal to 
refer to all of Canada’s Indigenous Peoples, a progressive interpretation of the word Indian today 
would mean to interpret it as we understand the word Aboriginal. Moreover, the Métis are 
viewed by the general Canadian society and by government officials to fall under the umbrella 
term Aboriginal. Plus, by interpreting the word Indian as we now know Aboriginal, the Supreme 
Court would be putting forth a clear statement that the Métis are just as equally Aboriginal as 
other Indigenous groups in Canada, because under this term, First-nations, Inuit and the Métis 
are equally considered to be Aboriginal.  
Step 2: Consider the Current Goals of Aboriginal Policy 
As outlined above, a living tree approach must still somewhat rely on a purposive 
approach to constitutional interpretation.264 While a living tree approach requires any 
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constitutional interpretation to be in line with the overall purpose of the provision, this does not 
mean that the living tree interpretation must further the original intent of the power.265 Rather it 
means that, like a tree, the constitution is capable of growth to accommodate new realities, but 
that it is limited in its movement because it has roots that are firmly planted in the ground.266  In 
order to apply the living tree interpretation to the Daniels case, it is then important to think about 
Section 91(24)’s overarching goals, which are to provide the Canadian federal government with 
a broad power over Indians, in order to be able to accommodate Canada’s goals of Aboriginal 
policy.  
Before considering the overall purpose behind Section 91(24) it is important to clarify 
some confusion surrounding the federal court judge's’ use of the word “purpose” in his reasons. 
First, Justice Phellan stated that, similarly to the same-sex reference, he was going to apply a 
purposive approach, or the living tree doctrine to this case.267 However, he equated a purposive 
approach with living tree approach, which is not exactly correct, especially considering his 
definition of purposive. He describes the purpose of Section 91(24) as the desire to control all 
Aboriginal People, to assimilate and control Indians, and to assist in the expansion of the west.268 
What he describes here however, is the original intent of the framers and not the purposive 
approach described by Miller, which can be rejected under a living tree approach. Later , 
however, he correctly articulates Section 91(24)’s overall purpose when explaining that the 
overall purpose of the Indian power is to give Canada a broad power to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over Indians, in order to accommodate any potential policy objectives.269 The 
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difference between the original intent and the overall purpose of a power is that the original 
intent is more about what the power was originally used for, while the purpose is more about the 
why the power was created. 
The federal court of appeals judge later clarifies the lower court judge’s opinion, when he 
says, “The Defendants’ argument that the purpose of s 91(24) was to allow the federal 
government the power to protect Indians and their lands because Indians were viewed as 
childlike uncivilized people [...] ignores the far broader and more acceptable purposes for the s 
91(24) power”, which he describes as, “the Crown’s responsibilities to natives, obligations under 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the need for coordinated approach to natives rather than the 
balkanized colonial regimes…”.270 Here, the federal court of appeals judge seems to be making 
the distinction between the original intent and the purpose, as he explains the overall purpose as 
a more long-term goal of the power, whereas the original intent is more about the use of the 
power when it was first created.  
Through keeping the overall purpose of Section 91(24) in mind, it is clear that in order to 
fulfil its purpose of providing Canada with a broad power over Indians, Section 91(24) must 
provide Canada with the power over all Indians. Thus, in order for the provision to continue to 
fulfil its intended overarching purpose, the federal government must have the explicit jurisdiction 
over all Aboriginal People, which inevitably includes the Métis. If the Supreme Court finds that 
the Métis are not found to be Section 91(24) Indians, then it is taking a much narrower view of 
91(24) from its original purpose. 
Another of Section 91(24)’s original purposes was to allow Canada the ability and 
flexibility to accommodate its potential future policy concerns and goals.271 Canada’s current 
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goals regarding its Aboriginal policy are to promote reconciliation and respect, and therefore, it 
becomes especially important for the federal government to include the Métis under these policy 
goals, as the Métis are likely to be the Aboriginal group the most in need of reconciliation. The 
Métis have suffered under many of the same detrimental policies as their First-Nation neighbors, 
but have not been awarded any of the programs in place today to correct these injustices, as a 
group whose Indigeneity has always been called into question.272 As Miller explained, engaging 
in a living tree approach that stays true to a provisions’ original purpose can still reject the 
framers original intentions with the provision. If the Supreme Court were to hand down the first 
declaration on the basis that it will help drive reconciliation efforts, it would be making a clear 
rejection of this original intentions of s.91(24) and instead highlight how s.91(24) today should 
be intended to better Aboriginal Peoples and correct historical wrongdoings, rather than 
discriminate against them.  
Again, here the main difference between the living tree approach and the originalist 
interpretation of the lower courts is that the question is framed in the present instead of in the 
past. The lower courts looked at the goals of Aboriginal Policy around the time of Section 
91(24)’s creation in order to determine whether the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians. Instead a 
living tree approach requires a consideration of the current goals of Aboriginal Policy, in order to 
determine whether the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians.  
Step 3: Consider the Modern Reality of Self-Identification 
As a living tree interpretation is used to accommodate to modern day realities, judges 
who apply the living tree approach should “be in tune with moral development and moral 
change”.273 Thus, it is important that the court consider the changes made surrounding 
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Aboriginal identity from 1867 until today. In 1867, government officials defined who was and 
who wasn’t Indian based off their own motivations, and based off their own understanding of 
Aboriginal identity as a racial identity. In contrast, today the Canadian government and the 
international community place a greater emphasis on self-determination and groups self-
identification as Indigenous.274   
As the section on language demonstrated, the Métis are largely considered to fall under 
the definition of Aboriginal, in both its definition in law and in general Canadian society. 
However, more emphasis should be placed on whether the Métis today consider themselves 
Aboriginal under 91(24), and consequently so, whether they consider themselves to be under the 
jurisdiction of the federal government as an Aboriginal Peoples.  
This progressive approach would not be entirely foreign to the court. The court has 
already considered whether the Métis viewed themselves as Indian, but it has done so in the past 
and usually through the perspective of government officials.275 Instead, a progressive approach 
requires that the Supreme Court ask this same question but in the present and directly to the 
Métis. In turn, this restores agency to the Métis who have been pried of such agency in the 
Daniels case.  
The lower court judges have been adamant in saying that the Daniels case is not a case 
about identity, but about constitutional jurisdiction.276 However, in many ways this case is about 
Aboriginal identity, or rather, it should be about Aboriginal identity under the living tree 
approach. The reason this case has not been about identity in the lower courts is because the they 
have approached this question the wrong way, by asking whether the framers intended for the 
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Métis to be considered Indian. In this sense, this case is purely about constitutional 
interpretation, as it seeks to interpret the constitution from the framers’ perspectives. Instead, a 
living tree interpretation should place emphasis on whether the Métis view themselves as Indian, 
and therefore whether they consider themselves to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal government. By asking who self-identifies as Aboriginal, the court is also asking who 
demands their rights as such to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. 
Thus, self-identification is clearly linked to this privilege afforded to Aboriginal People, of being 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.  
The answer to the question of whether the Métis self-identify as Aboriginal is already 
before the Supreme Court. While the court made a key observation in noting that there is not one 
representative capable of speaking for all of the Métis in Canada, two of the interveners in the 
Daniels case are National-level Métis councils, the National Métis Council and the Métis 
Federation of Canada.277 These national-level councils are likely the closest alternative to a 
national representative for all Métis, since they consult provincial Métis councils.278 Both Métis 
councils interveners have argued in favor of all three declarations.279 In a living tree approach, it 
is the voices of these councils that should be given the most weight in determining whether the 
Métis should be included within Section 91(24) today, and not the voices of Canadian officials 
speaking in the mid 1800s. This suggestion is consistent with norms of International Indigenous 
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Law of self-determination, where Indigenous People have the right to determine their own 
identity.280  
Additionally, we know the Métis do view themselves as aboriginal under Section 91(24) 
by looking at the circumstances which have lead to this action. The plaintiffs and many of the 
interveners have brought this case forward as a result of being denied the ability to deal with the 
federal government as an Indigenous nation, and being bounced back from the federal 
government to the provincial governments, leading to their treatment as “political footballs”.281 
These plaintiffs and interveners represent larger groups of Métis individual. Even the main 
plaintiff, at the time of filing the action, represented a larger group of Métis through being the 
president of the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples. Therefore, these Métis’ demands to be 
considered as Indian under Section 91(24) reflects the demands of many more Métis individuals. 
The courts have even more evidence before them that the Métis consider themselves Aboriginal 
through looking at the large increase in numbers of Canadians who now self-identify as Métis. In 
1867 there were very few Métis willing to claim their Aboriginal identity as Indians, and 
therefore, willing to claim that they were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian 
government. As mentioned earlier, this is not surprising considering that at the time, to be Indian 
was to be part of the lowest class of Canadian citizens.282 As such, the Métis would have tried to 
pass as “civilized men”.283 However, today there has been a large increase in the number of 
individuals reclaiming their Métis identities.284  
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As the above section demonstrated, there is now a general acceptance in Canadian society 
that the Métis constitute part of Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples. As a result, these Métis individuals 
are not only reclaiming their identity as a Métis person, but as an Aboriginal person, meaning 
they believe they should be entitled to the rights and privileges afforded to Aboriginal People by 
Canada.  
In summary, as a living tree approach requires that the general perceptions and realities 
of society be evaluated, the courts should find that today, Aboriginal identity is not determined 
by government officials, but rather by Indigenous individuals self-identifying as Aboriginal. By 
placing more emphasis on Métis’ own self-identification, the Supreme Court would also be 
increasing the amount of Métis agency in the Daniels case; something which has been lacking in 
the court proceedings thus far. Placing emphasis on self-identification would also allow for the 
court to come up with a ruling on the Métis that is not influenced by any ideas of the Métis as 
less Indigenous than other Indigenous groups, but rather allows for the Métis to put forth their 
own definition of themselves as an Aboriginal People.  
In summary, by applying the three step-definition of the living tree approach developed 
in chapter 1, the Métis can easily be included as Indian in Section 91(24). First, a broad 
interpretation of the language in Section 91(24) requires the word Indian to be interpreted as 
Aboriginal, which includes the Métis. Second, the consideration of the overall purpose of Section 
91(24) shows how the overarching purpose of the Indian power was to provide the federal 
government with a broad power, so that it could accommodate its future policy goals. Canada’s 
current policy goals are to engage in reconciliation with Aboriginal Peoples, and therefore, the 
Métis must be included. Lastly, a consideration of the general perceptions of society on 
Aboriginal identity show that today, more emphasis is placed on self-identification as 
 	  
91 
Aboriginal. Métis individuals and the Métis councils involved in the Daniels case have all 
affirmed their identities as Aboriginal Peoples, and the court should consider these Métis 
individuals and collectivities’ self-identification.  
By applying these steps required in a living tree interpretation of a constitutional 
provision, the Supreme Court will find that the Métis fall under the term Indian in Section 
91(24), in a way that rejects the role of race and puts forward a more appropriate view of the 
Métis. However, even though the implementation of a living tree approach will find the Métis to 
be Section 91(24) Indians, this declaration may do very little on its own if the other two 
declarations sought by the plaintiffs are not granted.  
 
Why the second and third declarations are necessary 
While the first declaration could provide a remedy to the Plaintiff’s problem in theory, 
Canada has repeatedly stated that even if the first declaration is granted, it is not required to do 
anything, meaning it can refuse to negotiate with the Métis, or choose not to include the Métis in 
any of their programs for Aboriginal Peoples.285 The defendants in this case even stated that the 
if the Supreme Court finds that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, this declaration will not do 
anything to solve the dispute, and might even cause more confusion.286 
Canada’s repeated statements saying it would not be required to do anything for the 
Métis, coupled with the fact that Canada has refused to listen to the Métis in the past and into the 
present day, means that a Supreme Court decision only granting the first declaration would likely 
result in no movement away from the status quo. Without the second and third declarations, the 
problem that this case has spent 17 years trying to address may continue to persist.  
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Fiduciary Duty  
Along with wanting to be recognized as Indian under Section 91(24) of the Constitution, 
the plaintiffs are also seeking a declaration from the Supreme Court explicitly stating that the 
federal government has a fiduciary duty towards the Métis People. Fiduciary duty exists when 
one party has the legal duty to act in the best interest of another. Once fiduciary duty exists, the 
courts are capable of keeping the fiduciary (the one owing the duty) accountable to act in the best 
interest of the principals (the ones to whom the duty is owned).287  
In R. v. Sparrow, a case regarding Aboriginal rights under Section 35, the Supreme Court 
wrote about the fiduciary duty that exists between the federal government and Aboriginal People 
under both Section 91(24) and Section 35, as “government's responsibility to act in a fiduciary 
capacity with respect to Aboriginal Peoples and so import some restraint on the exercise of 
sovereign power”.288 This meant that the government is required to justify any piece of legislation 
that could cause a burden on an Aboriginal group.289 
Later, a non-Section 35 case further expressed the importance of this relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal Peoples. The Supreme Court in Wewaykum Indian Band v. 
Canada ruled that this fiduciary relationship was not restricted to Section 35 rights. However, it 
went further to state that “fiduciary duty does not exist at large… because not all obligations 
between the parties to a fiduciary relationship are necessarily”.290  
Jean Teillet notes however, that fiduciary duty and a fiduciary relationship are two 
separate things. The fiduciary relationship is more of a guiding principle, and the fiduciary duty 
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is given in a particular instance.291 While the fiduciary relationship between Aboriginal People 
and the federal government is automatically given, fiduciary duty is not. The test for determine 
whether there exists fiduciary duty between an Aboriginal People and the federal government is 
to ask whether first, “is there a specific or cognizable aboriginal interest?”, and second, “has the 
crown assumed discretionary control, in the nature of private law duty, over that interest?”.292  
The problem with the Daniels case seems to be that the plaintiffs are asking for a general 
declaration that a fiduciary duty exists, but have not specified under what conditions or in what 
circumstances that duty should exist. Both lower courts have refused to grant the second 
declaration “without specific facts”.293 They stated that it was uncontested that there already 
exists a long-rooted tradition of a fiduciary relationship between the federal government and 
Canada’s Aboriginal People, and as such, this kind of declaration would lack practical utility.294. 
The Trial Judge found that with the first declaration, we would expect the federal government to 
act in line with whatever duty arises from this recognition, as the federal government is already 
expected to act in a fiduciary nature to Indians under Section 91(24) over whom it has the 
exclusive jurisdiction.295 However, the plaintiffs are seeking for a statement of fiduciary duty, 
not of the fiduciary relationship, which will already be given with the first declaration.  
While a declaration may find the Métis to be Section 91(24) Indians would place the 
Métis in this fiduciary relationship with the federal government, without a clear expression of 
fiduciary duty, it is hard to believe that the federal government would make the necessary efforts 
to ensure it acts as a fiduciary towards the Métis, considering Canada’s recent history of refusing 
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to listen to the Métis. Moreover, Canada’s inconsistent treatment of the Métis as Indians, and its 
justification behind such treatment through its racial understanding of the Métis is also 
concerning. Without an explicit declaration of fiduciary duty, Canada’s historic view of the 
Métis as less-Indigenous, and its strong opposition in this case suggest that even with the 
issuance of the first declaration, Canada may continue to treat the Métis as not fully Indigenous, 
and therefore, not fully deserving a relationship as such.  
The court claims it cannot give a declaration of fiduciary duty in general, but in Sparrow, 
the judge spoke of fiduciary duty a broad sense when he said the guiding principle of Section 35 
was rooted in a fiduciary duty. Here, the Supreme Court can also make a general statement that 
Section 91(24) is rooted in a fiduciary relationship. In fact, the lower courts have stated almost 
exactly what the plaintiffs want to hear, but they have not done so as part of an official 
declaration. They stated that, with granting the first declaration, fiduciary duty will be implied. 
Stating that there exists a fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal People 
without wanting to formally qualify it in law seems like yet another example of the government 
giving “lip-service” to the Métis, where words seem to solve a problem in practice, but they 
never carry their weight in practice.  
While the courts seem to be afraid of the consequences this declaration will have on the 
federal government, they should be more worried of the consequences of not granting the second 
declaration. If they do not grant the second declaration, the Daniels case may have been a big 
waste of time and money, as it will not have done anything to solve the problem it set out to 
resolve. If Canada denies to do anything after the first declaration is granted, the Métis may still 
be in the kind of limbo the Daniels case sought to address.  
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If the Supreme Court grants the second declaration however, it can finally help answer 
the question the Daniels case has spent 17 years to answer, and which the Métis have been 
anticipating for decades. Moreover, by also granting the second declaration, the Supreme Court 
would be reaffirming Canada’s commitment to the UNDRIP, as Article 20 states that “states 
shall cooperate in good faith with Indigenous Peoples”.296 However, if the Supreme Court really 
wants to make sure this case results in more than symbolic change, it will also need to grant the 
plaintiff’s third declaration. This is because the fiduciary duty only requires for the federal 
government to act in the best interest of its principals, but it does not itself require any 
negotiation or consultation process.  
Duty to Consult 
The plaintiffs are also requesting a declaration that explicitly outlines the federal 
government’s duty to consult with the Métis. As its name explains, the duty to consult exists 
when one party has a duty to consult another party for one or more specific matters that concern 
the other party. Supreme Court cases, Haida Nation v. British Columbia, and Taku River Tinglit 
First Nation v. British Columbia established the duty to consult in cases where Aboriginal Rights 
had not been made clear, or had not been proven in court.297 Taku explained that “the scope of 
the duty to consult ... will vary with the circumstances, but always requires meaningful, good 
faith consultation and willingness  on the part of the Crown to make changes based on 
information that emerges during the process.”298 For there to be a duty to consult between 
Canada and Indigenous Peoples, Canada has to have knowledge of an Aboriginal right or title 
claim, and it must be considering actions that might negatively affect such rights.299  
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The plaintiffs in the Daniels case are seeking a declaration which would require Canada 
to “negotiate and consult with MNSI, on a collective basis through representation of their choice, 
with respect to their rights, interests and needs as Aboriginal Peoples”.300 But again, the lower 
courts found that without a specific issue that requires the duty to consult, the third declaration 
could not be granted.301 Another reason the lower courts did not grant the duty to consult was 
that it felt that the plaintiffs’ concern would be remedied with the first declaration. The trial 
judge stated that, with the removal of the confusion over constitutional jurisdiction, the plaintiffs 
should be able to get the kinds of discussions they are seeking to have with the federal 
government. Here the court wrongly equated the plaintiffs’ desire for a declaration on the duty to 
consult with the plaintiffs’ desire for a clarification of their Aboriginal rights.302  
However, the plaintiffs are asking for more than to simply have the right to be heard by 
federal government with their concerns, which is itself highly unlikely to occur with only the 
first declaration. The plaintiffs are asking for an articulation by the court that the government 
must negotiate with the Métis, not that it can negotiate with them. The difference is that the third 
declaration puts the government in a place where it cannot decide when and when not to listen to 
the Métis, but where it must listen to the Métis when the Métis bring forward concerns to the 
federal government, or when the government is legislating on matters pertaining to the Métis. 
Furthermore, considering the fact that the Métis have never received a clear clarification from 
the federal government about their Sec 35 rights, there is the need for more than a declaration 
that simply allows Canada to listen to the Métis if it and when it pleases, but rather requires 
Canada to meet with the Métis and define such rights, as one of the goals this case set out to 
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achieve was the ability to negotiate with the federal government to define Section 35 rights. 
Lastly, since the purpose behind the duty to consult between the federal government and the 
Aboriginal People of Canada is to promote reconciliation, there is a clear need for this duty to be 
established between the Métis and Canada, as the Métis are in extreme need for reconciliation.303  
This declaration too, would be a reaffirmation of Canada’s commitment to the UNDRIP, 
as Article 19 also outlines a clear duty to consult between states and Indigenous Peoples. It says 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous Peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them”.304  
In conclusion, the lower courts believe that the fiduciary duty and the duty to consult will 
come inevitably with the first declaration. While that may have been the case with other 
Aboriginal groups who fall under 91(24), there are clear indications that the Métis will not be 
afforded this same respect by the federal government. The government’s recent history, 
especially since the 1980s, of denying its jurisdiction over the Métis, coupled with the fact that it 
has repeatedly argued that it would not be required to do anything even if the Supreme Court 
grants the first declaration, are clear indications that Canada would not be willing to act in the 
best interest of the Métis, or to consult the Métis. Moreover, since the Métis have been left out of 
programs and benefits accorded to Aboriginal People, fiduciary duty and the duty to consult that 
is specific to the Métis will be crucial to ensure that such programs can also be tailored to fit the 
needs of Métis People. While a declaration that the Métis are Indian under Section 91(24) will 
state that the Métis are equally as Indigenous to these other aboriginal groups, all of these 
                                                
303. Teillet, 9-9, 9-10.  
304. UNDRIP, Article 19.  
 	  
98 
Aboriginal groups are still unique from one another. Therefore, since Canada will not have 
previously included the Métis under its new reconciliation era, it will be important for it to act in 
the best interest of the Métis and to consult the Métis.  
These declarations will be crucial to ensure that history does not repeat itself, and that the 
Métis are also allowed the treatment associated with being recognized as Indian. The supreme 
court has the opportunity to demand that Canada fully acknowledged the Métis’ status as an 
Indigenous People, and that it finally acts accordingly. 
 
Implications  
The Daniels decision cannot come soon enough. As the Trial Judge noted, there is a clear 
sense of urgency to this ruling, because this case has already cost about 5-6 million dollars, and 
has been going on for 17 years now.305 However, the dispute it seeks to solve has arguably been 
lasting much longer than that. The 1980s brought in a new era, of more respectful Aboriginal 
Policy in Canada and Canada began the long process of reconciliation with its Aboriginal 
population.306 At the same time, however, Canada began strengthening its position that the Métis 
were not included under Section 91(24).307 As such, the Métis have been awaiting these 
declarations for much longer than 17 years. All these years of denying the Métis the right to be 
included under the federal government’s jurisdiction has made the Métis to “most collaterally 
damaged group of people in Canada.”308 This is because the Métis have suffered under some of 
the same detrimental policies as First-Nations People, but have been denied any programs and 
                                                
305. Daniels, 79.  
306. Ibid., 99-100, 139, 512.  
307. Ibid., 27.  
308. Ibid., 108.  
 	  
99 
benefits to help them heal.309 That being said, the Métis have waited long enough to finally be 
recognized as one of Canada’s Aboriginal groups, in order to begin the long process of 
reconciliation ahead.  
Not only is there a clear sense of urgency behind the Daniels decision, but any decision 
released by the Supreme Court must be well-thought out because it will not only literally impact 
the Métis, but any declaration may also carry symbolic meaning for both the Métis and to the 
general Canadian population. 
Only the first declaration 
While the first declaration would help clarify whether the federal government or the 
provinces have the exclusive jurisdiction over the Métis, this clarification will do little on its 
own. Through only handing down the first declaration, it is unlikely that this case will solve any 
of the concerns raised by the plaintiffs, or correct the fact that the Métis are still a “collaterally 
damaged” people. There are clear reasons to believe that the Crown will not consider the Métis 
for any programs or benefits, or even sit down and negotiate with the Métis in order to determine 
a path to reconciliation, since it has repeatedly stated that not only will it not be required to 
change its ways if the first declaration is issued, but that the first declaration will potentially lead 
to more confusions. As a result, if the Supreme Court grants the first declaration, the Métis might 
be in even more of a gridlock, now having clarity over the confusion that existed, but without 
any real answers, creating a more symbolic than practical decision. 
If the Supreme Court only grants the first declaration, it will mean likely mean that the 
Métis will be included under Section 91(24) in theory, but similarly to Métis’ inclusion under 
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Section 35, not in practice. The Métis might have to continue to fight for Canada to acknowledge 
the Métis’ rights in accordance with their inclusion in 91(24). 
No declaration 
If the Supreme Court decides not to hand down any of the three declarations, the Métis 
remain in this confusion over whether to go to the provinces or the federal government, and both 
levels of government will continue to deny their jurisdiction over the Métis. The Métis would 
also be denied the ability to negotiate and be considered for government programs and benefits 
for Aboriginal People, and as such, remain the most “collaterally damaged” people in Canada.  
This kind of ruling also risks being interpreted wrongly by Canadians who might draw 
the conclusion that the Métis are not considered to be part of Canada’s Aboriginal People, which 
would give Canadians another reason to view the Métis as less Indigenous. Already there has 
been many misinformation spread regarding the lower courts decisions. After the lower courts 
ruled that the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, many Canadians misunderstood these decisions 
as a statement that the Métis would be equal to First-Nations People, or Status Indians and 
therefore, would require more money coming for taxpayers to be spent on Aboriginal Peoples.310   
Additionally, this decision would also mean the denial of Métis nationhood, and the 
ability the Métis have to negotiate with the Canadian government on a nation-to-nation basis, as 
many Indigenous nations have in North America. For example, First Nations and the Inuit have 
this ability, in theory, under Section 91(24). Their inclusion in the Indian power gives them the 
ability to consult and negotiate with the federal government as a sovereign nation. In the United 
States as well, federally recognized tribes have the ability to negotiate and consult with the 
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United States government on a nation-to-nation basis. However, with no declaration, the Métis 
will be the only of the three main aboriginal groups in Canada lacking the status and treatment as 
an Indigenous nation.  
This kind of ruling could potentially be interpreted by the Métis as a statement that they 
fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces and not of the federal government, which would make 
the Métis the only Aboriginal group needing to deal with the provinces. Provinces are not 
nations, and so this ruling could be viewed by the Métis as a mockery of their claim to 
Indigeneity, as they would be denied treatment as an Indigenous nation.  
Falling under provincial jurisdiction would especially be concerning for the Métis whose 
population spans across several borders, as a people who existed before these borders were 
drawn up. Some Métis individuals belong to a Métis council in a province in which they do not 
reside. For example, the Manitoba Métis Federation (MMF) now allows for Métis individuals 
without residence status in Manitoba to apply for enrollment in the MMF, in order to 
accommodate its members who may live in other provinces but may still have ties to the historic 
Red River Métis settlement.311 Moreover, some Métis communities might exist within two 
provinces, which would make the process for achieving any rights or reconciliation extremely 
slow and complex, as these communities would have to deal with more than one province. 
Provinces who share a Métis community might pull the same stunt that Métis here, and deny 
their jurisdiction over the Métis group, again leaving the Métis in jurisdictional limbo. 
All three declarations 
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If the Supreme Court grants all three declarations it will be reaffirming Métis’ status as 
an indigenous nation not only through finding that the Métis are part of Canada’s Aboriginal 
population, but through ensuring that Canada honors this status this through consulting and 
negotiating with the Métis in good faith, as it would with any other nation.  
By granting all three declarations, the Supreme Court would be correcting the idea that 
the Métis are mixed and therefore less Indigenous than other Aboriginal People. A Supreme 
Court decision with all three declarations would send a clear message to the general Canadian 
population that the Métis are just as Aboriginal as First-Nations People and the Inuit. It would 
also be correcting the fact that the Métis have been recognized as Indian in the past, but have not 
always been treated as fully Indian. In granting all three declarations, the Supreme court would 
also send the clear message that the Métis cannot simply be recognized as Aboriginal, but must 
be treated as such.  
Despite being the outcome that the Plaintiffs desire, and despite its likelihood of 
achieving more than just the first declaration on its own, it is unlikely that a Supreme Court 
decision which grants all three declarations will result in any immediate changes. While common 
misconception of the Daniels case has been a fear that this declaration will result in having all 
programs and benefits for Indians immediately extended to the Métis, this likely won’t be the 
case.312 If the Supreme Court upholds the lower courts’ declaration, the road to have the Métis 
included under certain programs and benefits for Aboriginal Peoples will be long and the Métis 
will have to put up a good fight to be taken seriously.313 However, considering Canada’s 
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mistreatment of the Métis, the likelihood for this declaration to lea to any significant impacts for 
the Métis is slim. Especially if the Supreme Court does not grant the other two declarations 
sought by the plaintiffs. However, even if it will take years before the Métis come to be treated 
fully as Aboriginal by the federal government, this is the first step and it is needed before 
anything else can happen.  
 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court will soon decide the Daniels case. The Daniels court has the potential 
to not only to provide clarification of Métis’ status as Indian under Section 91(24), but it can also 
change the Daniels conversation to reflect a more current and accurate depiction of the Métis, 
their history, and their unique status as an Aboriginal People.  
 
Conclusions 
In order to highlight the problems with the lower courts decision, and to also find that the 
Métis are Section 91(24) Indians in a way that is is respectful to the Métis, the Supreme Court 
would need to approach the Daniels question from a certain methodology. This methodology 
includes a certain understanding of Métis identity, put forth by Chris Andersen, who explains 
why it is problematic to understand the Métis as a mixed people. Additionally, the lessons and 
goals from the field of American Indian and Indigenous Studies are also an important component 
of a methodology that allows for the successful interpretation of this case. The most important 
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aspect of the methodology however, is the living tree approach to constitutional interpretation. 
Contrarily to the method of the originalist interpretation, the living tree approach can find that 
the Métis are Section 91(24) Indians, while also rejecting the view of the Métis as mixed.   
The idea of the Métis as mixed has been present throughout Métis’ inclusion in federal 
Indian policy since before the creation of Canada. Through being viewed as mixed or as half-
Indian, half-white, the Métis were treated as not quite Indian, but not quite white under federal 
Indian Policy. Whether the Métis were viewed as Indian or white was dependent on which view 
complemented Canada’s own goals and motivations at the time. What justified either treatment 
of the Métis however, was Canada’s racial understanding of the Métis as mixed.  
While the lower courts could have chosen to stop viewing the Métis as mixed, instead 
they continued Canada’s history of treating the Metis as a mixed people. The lower courts’ 
originalist interpretation of the Daniels question perpetuated these ideas of the Métis as mixed 
and therefore, as less Indigenous. By interpreting the Daniels question from the perspective of 
the framers of the constitution, the lower courts’ conversations relied on a racial view of 
Aboriginal Peoples and on the federal government’s own goals and motivations. While the lower 
courts came to the correct conclusion, analyzing how they arrived to their conclusions revealed 
that these decisions can work to further the idea of the Métis as less Indigenous than other 
Aboriginal People. This is because further analysis of how the lower courts came to their 
conclusions shows that the only reason they were able to find that the Métis are Section 91(24) 
Indians was through placing more emphasis on Métis’ Indian half. This means the lower courts’ 
very declaration of finding the Métis to be Indian, actually views the Métis as less Indian than 
other Indigenous Peoples.  
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In an attempt to correct these problems, a living tree approach to the Daniels case can 
allow for the Supreme Court to arrive at the same conclusion, in finding that the Métis are 
Section 91(24) Indians. However, it would arrive at this conclusion by rejecting the role of race 
in determining who falls under section 91(24), and instead evaluate the Métis’ claim to 
Indigeneity in a more appropriate manner. By coming to the conclusion that the Métis are 
included under Section 91(24) through a living tree interpretation of the Daniels question, the 
Métis are able to be seen as equally Aboriginal to other aboriginal groups in Canada. However, 
in order for the Supreme Court not to repeat the history Canada has in treating the Métis as 
Indian in principle but never in practice, the other two declarations sought by the plaintiffs are 
necessary. Only by granting all three of the plaintiffs’ declarations will the Supreme Court be 
acknowledging the Métis’ unique status as one of Canada’s Aboriginal People, and ensuring that 
the Métis be treated as such. 
 
Reevaluating Goals 
This paper ultimately sought to answer the Daniels question, of whether the Métis are 
Section 91(24) Indians. However, in doing so, this paper also sought to provide a more accurate 
way to think of the Métis in Canadian law, by incorporating a more appropriate understanding of 
the Métis, as well as the lessons from the field of AIIS. As such, this paper was an attempt to 
unite together the legal field with the field of American Indian and Indigenous Studies. The 
methodology laid out in chapter 1 was not only useful in coming to a conclusion the right way, 
but it allowed for the union of these two fields. By using the living tree approach as a method to 
answer the Daniels question, a more accurate understanding of the Métis and of the Indian power 
was able to surface in this legal discussion.  
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However, this method of incorporating AIIS into legal analysis is not yet well developed 
in Canada. While these fields often do interact, they do so more in regards to pushing for the 
inclusion of Indigenous legal traditions as a legitimate form of law alongside Canada’s legal 
system. This method was different, because it advocated for the inclusion of certain 
understandings to analyze a legal question in a traditional court setting.  
 
Areas for further research 
While many scholars of AIIS conduct scholarly work that involves legal analyses of 
cases of Aboriginal law, most of this kind of work involves analyzing a court decision and the 
implications of the court decision. Rarely does scholarship in AIIS take a deep analytical look 
into the discussions that go into producing a specific court decision, and in doing so, analyze the 
discussion from the lessons and goals of AIIS. Therefore, there is a need for more scholarship in 
AIIS that considers how the Canadian or American legal system is thinking about Indigeneity 
and thinking about Métisness. This is especially necessary since the Supreme Court is 
increasingly asked to hear cases concerning Aboriginal Peoples and their rights.  
Another area for future scholarship is the further application of Chris Andersen’s 
understanding of the Métis to other legal conversations concerning the Métis. While Andersen 
has applied his understanding of the Métis to some statutes that concern the Métis, more 
application of his ideals on to more modern interpretation of the Métis will be necessary.314 
There are other areas, outside of the law, that could also benefit from the application of his 
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understanding of Métis, such as school curriculums, government agencies’ definitions of the 
Métis, or even in Métis governments.  
As one of the main problems with the Daniels case was the lack of Métis agency, more 
research should be done on ways to improve this problem. This would include more research and 
efforts to finally appoint an Aboriginal justice on the Supreme court, and to increase the number 
of Aboriginal judges on other Canadian courts. This research could include studying the 
possibility and efficiency of having a quota placed on the Supreme Court, to meet a minimum 
number of Aboriginal Justice(s). The lack of Métis agency in the Daniels case was also due to 
the evidence submitted to the trial, as well at what kind of evidence and testimonies which the 
court chose to emphasize. In the Daniels case, most of the evidence was documentation of the 
Métis by their colonial governments. In order to increase the amount of agency Aboriginal 
People have in Canadian court cases, it would be necessary for courts to admit pieces of 
evidence that may not be in line with traditional, admissible evidence. This is especially 
important for Aboriginal People, whose history may only have been “documented”, in a Western 
sense, by settlers. While we know that Aboriginal People still had ways to document their own 
histories and even had their own legal systems themselves, these forms of histories are not 
always accepted into western scholarship, and would especially struggle to hold up in court 
cases. As such, an area for further research could include studying ways in which the already 
existing Canadian court system can incorporate non-western legal sources.  
One last area that will inevitably need more research if any of the plaintiffs’ declarations 
are granted, is in the outcome of this decision. This will be especially important since historical 
court decisions such as this one often produce a lot of noise once they are released, but do little 
to hold up to their expectations. This phenomenon is especially true for the Métis, who have seen 
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this happen with both their inclusion under Section 35 of the Constitution of 1982 and the later 
Powley case. Therefore, it will be important for further research to highlight how the Daniels 
decision has changed the situation of the Métis.  
Additionally, when historic decisions are released that seem to produce a positive 
outcome, this can lead to a quieting down phenomenon, where because a pivotal ruling occurred, 
people expect the problem to be solved. For example, when the US Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of marriage equality in June 2015, the cause for LGBTQ rights was halted, as many people 
assumed that with this decision, the fight for LGBTQ equality was achieved. The same risks to 
be true for the Métis if the Supreme Court rules in favor of their inclusion under Section 91(24). 
The Métis risk being quieted if they bring forward other concerns, and so more research should 
be dedicated to the Métis, as they continue to not only be recognized as an Indigenous People, 
but as they fight to be treated as such.  
In conclusion, the Daniels case is full of promises in clarifying the complicated status the 
Métis have come to occupy in Canadian law as neither Indian nor white. It has the opportunity to 
rule that the Métis are part of Canada’s Aboriginal population, and should be treated as such 
under Canadian law. The Supreme Court has the ability to reject the role of race in defining the 
Métis throughout the history of Canadian Indian policy, and to finally put forth a decision that 
would acknowledge Métis’ unique status as an Aboriginal People. By rejecting the role race has 
had in defining the Métis as a mixed people, the Supreme Court can send out a message to Métis 
and non-Métis alike that the Métis are not any less Indigenous than other Aboriginal People, and 
are owed the same rights and respect afforded to all of Canada’s Aboriginal People today. 
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